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INTRODUCTION
Veil piercing may not be the "most litigated issue in corporate law,"'
but it is surely the least loved. In 1985, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fis-
chel famously charged that the law of piercing is "freakish[]." 2  "Like
lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled."' In the years since, the cho-
rus has only swelled in volume. Scholars have described piercing opinions
as "awkward," "vague,"' and "jumbled."' Excoriating the doctrine as a
"notoriously problematic," "unprincipled hodgepodge of seemingly ad hoc
and unpredictable results,"' they conclude that it is "highly discretionary
and problematic for the business planner."' Indeed, the veil's unpredictable
security has sparked hundreds of law review articles.o
Many legal scholars have sought to tame the veil piercing beast
through normative proposals ranging from more efficient rules," to statuto-
ry reform, 2 to rethinking what goals courts ought to be maximizing, 3 to ab-
I Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1036, 1036 (1991). Thompson compared the incidence of the term "veil piercing" in opinions to the in-
cidence of terms like "hostile takeover," declining to broaden the search to more common terms like "fi-
duciary duty." Id. at 1036 n.1. But, as this Article will show, "litigated" cases begin with complaints.
Westlaw's pleadings database contains 2071 federal and state complaints potentially making veil pierc-
ing allegations between 2000 and 2005. A similar search for "(loyalty disloyalty) /s (director* officer)"
returned 2405 complaints.
2 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 89, 89 (1985).
Id.
4 Lainie Rutkow & Stephen P. Teret, Limited Liability and the Public's Health, 35 J.L. MED. &
ETHIcs 599, 605 (2007).
Frederick Tung, Limited Liability and Creditors' Rights: The Limits of Risk Shifiing to Creditors,
34 GA. L. REV. 547, 568 (2000).
Daniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All the Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine to a New Business
Order, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 542 (2007).
John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal Jurisdiction Over Corpo-
rate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. REv. 445, 451 (2004) ("Discern-
ing the precise contours of piercing doctrine is notoriously problematic.").
David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited
Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1311 (2007).
9 Sandra K. Miller, Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the European
Community and in the US.: A Comparative Analysis of U.S., German, and UK. Veil-Piercing Ap-
proaches, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 73, 94 (1998).
1o A search on March 29, 2010 in Westlaw's JLR database for "veil Is pier! & da(aft 01/01/1985)"
returned 5,482 results. Robert Thompson's 1991 case-counting article, Thompson, supra note 1, itself
played a significant role in precipitating the empirical revolution in legal studies. See, e.g., David S.
Goldman, Legal Construct Validation: Expanding Empirical Legal Scholarship to Unobservable Con-
cepts, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 79, 122 (2007) (praising Thompson's study and noting its influence).
I See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension Between
Form and Substance, 60 BUS. LAw. 109, 125-36 (2004).
12 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing
the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 95, 123-34 (2001) (proposing sta-
tutory reforms to achieve more predictability in veil piercing against LLCs).
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olishing the doctrine altogether.14 Such normative and empirical work has
had real-world consequences: consultants and entrepreneurs use rankings of
treatment of the piercing problem across jurisdictions in marketing particu-
lar states' incorporation regimes." And, surprisingly, the market for corpo-
rate control seems to have responded to such piercing-centered rankings.'"
This Article asserts that current veil piercing scholarship is founded on
sand. Scholars, courts, corporations, and their lawyers have all over-relied
on judges' ultimate decisions to pierce and, in particular, on how judges
justify themselves. Such reliance misleads for two principal reasons. First,
trial court opinions are rare: as few as three percent of all federal trial court
judicial decisions are reasoned opinions available for easy study on Wes-
tlaw." Second, a trial judge's decision to write an opinion-and what ex-
planations she offers in support of her decision-is self-serving and
difficult to predict.'" The resulting sampling errors have produced an inco-
herent picture of veil piercing doctrine; until now, we have been predicting
the iceberg by its odd, biased tip."
13 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 8; Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the
Problem?, 37 CONN. L. REV. 619, 627-34 (2005).
14 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 479, 514-34 (2001)
[hereinafter Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil
Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 102-05. Contra Daniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All the Veils: Applying
an Established Doctrine to a New Business Order, 32 IOWA J. CORP. L. 529, 558-62 (2007).
Is See infra text accompanying notes 30-34.
16 Id.
17 See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and
Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 710 (2007) ("Overall, of the 5,736 judicial actions we recorded,
only 178-3/o-came accompanied by opinions."); see also id. at 696-98 (reviewing the literature
studying opinion generation from district courts); Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts
Through Published Cases: A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYs. J. 782, 789-90 (1992) (approximately five
percent of cases led to published, reported opinions in a single-district study (excluding single recovery
cases)); Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching, and Poli-
cymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 165 (2006) (finding that
not even nine percent of case terminations led to accessible opinions and only 2.3 percent led to pub-
lished opinions, according to a nationwide study).
Is See, e.g., Hoffman et al., supra note 17, at 732-33 (suggesting judges may write to avoid rever-
sal); Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 1, 17-25 (2004) (correlating judicial opinion-writing with various self-maximizing mo-
tives).
19 We do not make the claim that doctrinal analysis, especially of appellate decisions, provides no
value. To the contrary, as Professor Sisk recently wrote:
As empiricists work to capture legal doctrine in quantitative terms, and conduct experiments de-
signed to accurately describe the role and operation of legal (and non-legal) factors in judicial de-
cisions, traditional doctrinal scholarship remains vital in identifying the pertinent doctrines and
sub-doctrines that apply within a field of law. In addition, doctrine varies across and within areas
of law in multiple ways: venerability or novelty; stability or fluidity; extent of integration within a
larger coherent system of doctrine; sharpness of definition; mandatory or optional invocation;
substantive or procedural character; and reliance on bright-line rules versus discretion in the ba-
lancing of factors or standards.
Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial
Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 891 (2008) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION
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Our approach in this Article is distinct. We collected a large sample of
complaints and counterclaims filed in federal district courts from 2000 to
2005 in which parties asserted that they should be permitted to pierce the
veil. Following the principle that in corporate law "what the courts do is of
far more importance than what they say,"20 we examined the litigation
events arising from these complaints in detail. We examined the outcomes
of motions addressing veil piercing, whether in preliminary motion practice,
during discovery, at summary judgment, at trial, or in post-trial practice.
We also analyzed the significant non-veil piercing motion practice in each
case as a control. The resulting database consists of a set of observations
which speak to the life of veil piercing law, rather than the gauzy rationali-
zations presented by judges' written opinions.
Our analysis of these data advances a new and robust form of legal
realism: the intensive quantitative study of dockets.2 1 To our knowledge,
ours is one of the first projects that applies this method to a particular area
of law, outside of bankruptcy, and connects characteristics of particular
complaints to motion practice and ultimate dispositions.22 Indeed, the Ar-
ticle intends to provoke scholars to rethink what it means to investigate the
"law" of veil piercing. By focusing on disputes rather than opinions, cer-
tain patterns emerge:
Parties generally craft complaints in ways that the conventional wis-
dom would predict. In particular, plaintiffs allege fraud, informali-
ties, dominion and control, and alter ego as reasons to pierce the veil.
MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)). Our points are merely that: (1) empirical analysis of
opinions from the district courts is especially likely to mislead; and (2) a doctrine that is said to be irre-
ducibly incoherent may not be quite so bad.
20 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40 HARV.
L. REv. 521, 531 (1927).
21 There is a growing literature using collections from PACER to reach specific conclusions about,
for example, particular kinds of decisions or outcomes that are not otherwise apparent. See, e.g., Orley
Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 265-66 (1995) (detailing how various
information, including prevailing parties, was collected from dockets); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte
Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111,
126-27 (2009) (collecting settlement statistics from dockets). Others have used PACER to build better
databases of particular kinds of litigation. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, & Lynn Bai,
There Are Plaintiffs and... There Are Plaintifs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Set-
tlements, 61 VAND. L. REv. 355, 367-68 (2008) (using PACER to collect a sample of securities class
action disputes); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construc-
tion Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REv. 223, 240-41, 273-75 (2008) (using PACER and
other resources to create a database of district court judges that heard claim construction appeals to de-
termine the effect of judge experience on reversal). Our approach is distinct, as we first used Westlaw,
not PACER, to collect complaints and then used PACER to develop a true longitudinal study of litiga-
tion-coding nondispositive and dispositive motions, not merely final orders or settlements.
22 See also Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D. Martin, How Should
We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 83, 110-12 (2009) (studying
EEOC cases brought in federal district court from filing to conclusion).
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Contract causes of action are present in the highest percentage of
complaints, followed by tort, fraud, and labor law claims. However,
because multiple causes of action are ordinarily present in each com-
plaint, it is not truly accurate to say that there is such a thing as a
"contract case" or a "tort case," at least in the beginning of litigation.
* Judicial characteristics appear to have a limited but important influ-
ence on plaintiffs' ability to pierce the veil. Surprisingly, conserva-
tive judges are more likely to view veil piercing claims favorably than
liberal judges. We did not find evidence that a judge's race or gender
affected the disposition of these cases.
* Firms with few employees are more likely to lose veil piercing mo-
tions than firms with many employees. This finding undermines or-
thodox understandings of how the corporate liability shield works to
promote risk taking, and it raises questions about why early-stage en-
trepreneurs incorporate.
* We found mixed evidence about factors used in most discussions of
veil piercing, including the relationship between plaintiffs and defen-
dants, defendants' legal organizations, and defendants' legal sophisti-
cation. Models of veil piercing success at the motions level
performed better than models of veil piercing success at the case lev-
el. These results highlight the role that selection plays in litigation
even before trial.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. First, we lay out a theory of how
we expect veil piercing litigation to work. Second, we discuss our data col-
lection and methodology in more detail. Third, we provide the results of
our descriptive and inferential statistical analyses. Fourth, and finally, we
lay out the main implications of our findings for how jurists ought to think
about veil piercing disputes and limited liability more generally.
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EXPECTATIONS
To study veil piercing disputes using dockets, rather than judicial opi-
nions, we develop a set of expectations about the content of plaintiffs' com-
plaints, from the causes of action that are present to the types of veil
piercing allegations that are made.23 We derive these expectations largely
from existing quantitative studies.24 Then, we hypothesize about the fac-
23 See generally David Zaring, Three Models of Constitutional Torts, 2 J. TORT L. 183, 194 (2008)
("To make sense of the suits of last resort, only a review of complaints will do.").
24 See, e g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Contract-Centered Veil Piercing, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 121, 127-30 (2007) (comparing the incidence of veil piercing references in contract and tort opi-
nions); Lee C. Hodge & Andrew B. Sachs, Piercing the Mist: Bringing the Thompson Study into the
1990s, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 341 (2008) (applying Thompson's methodology in order to study judi-
cial veil piercing behavior from 1986 to 1995); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Preserving LLC Veil Pierc-
ing: A Response to Bainbridge, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1063, 1068-77 (2006) (using Thompson's
857
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tors, both entity- and judge-specific, that are likely to influence judicial
reactions to veil piercing motions.
A. Veil Piercing Complaints
In structuring their filings, counseled plaintiffs should act strategical-
ly,25 reacting to factors as general as the national economy and as specific as
the set of precedent that a lawyer holds in her file drawer.26 There is little
that federal plaintiffs cannot control in the first filed complaint,27 and they
should be guided by the available best practices and evidence.28 Such
methodology to study LLC veil piercing trends); Swain & Aguilar, supra note 7, at 463-83 (studying
jurisdictional veil piercing); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corpo-
rate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379 (1999) (studying veil piercing trends by
expanding his original dataset to include cases through 1996 and focusing on corporate groups); Thomp-
son, supra note 1 (initial study of veil-piercing trends from 1905 to 1986); see also Robert B. Thomp-
son, The Taming of Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 940-42 (1995) (providing a
non-quantitative analysis of LLC veil piercing).
25 We have collected information about representation, and plan to analyze it in future work.
26 See, e.g., Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination
Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL
STuD. 427, 460-61 (1995) (finding that settlement rates and plaintiff-win rates for certain claims vary
with the business cycle and economic downturns, and suggesting that plaintiffs account for this in select-
ing and pleading their cases).
27 Some might argue that the only factor that a plaintiff cannot control, at least in the first-filed
complaint in federal court, is the particular jurisprudential approach of the judge assigned to his case.
Even this can be predicted with great, if not perfect, accuracy. And judge shopping can happen, espe-
cially in certain districts.
28 Sources (apart from personal and networked experience) include form complaints, secondary
sources, and materials from the Practicing Law Institute (PLI), the American Bar Association (ABA),
and state-specific Continuing Legal Education (CLE) programs. To guide actual drafting of the com-
plaint, a few jurisdictions offer bare-bones forms for veil piercing complaints, interrogatories, or defen-
dants' answers, but generally do not cite to any sources. See, e.g., LexisNexis(R) Forms, Complaint in
Action Against Parent Corporation Seeking to Pierce Corporate Veil and to Set Aside Fraudulent Con-
veyance of Assets from Subsidiary to Parent (New York), FORM 70-DC276:3 (covering inadequate ca-
pitalization, intercompany transfers, overlapping officers, directors and personnel, lack of independent
business discretion, and guaranty of debts as factors supporting veil piercing); LexisNexis(R), Com-
plaint Seeking to Pierce the Corporate Veil (Ohio), Forms: FORM 4336-212.12.3 (covering lack of for-
malities, control and domination, commingling, undercapitalization, and fraud as factors supporting veil
piercing). Given the lack of jurisdiction-specific guidance, lawyers likely look to secondary sources,
which are necessarily more general and which emphasize that the particular weight given to any factor
might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g., 45 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Grounds for
Disregarding the Corporate Entity and Piercing the Corporate Veil §§ 12-15 (2008) (describing under-
capitalization, diversion of funds by dominant shareholders, and failure to observe corporate formalities
in detail, and then listing thirty-one additional factors for veil piercing from Krendle & Krendle's 1978
article, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENVER L.J. 1 (1978)); 18 AM. JUR. 2D
Corporate Existence, Franchise, and Charter; Attributes as Legal Entity §§ 46-57 (2008) (discussing
theories of veil piercing, likely beneficiaries, and factors).
Attorneys who rely on these sources are using existing empirical knowledge second-hand to craft
their complaints. See, e.g., 45 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Grounds for Disregarding the Corporate
Entity and Piercing the Corporate Veil § 6 (2008) (citing Thompson's empirical studies of veil pierc-
ing); Mark Cohen & Sierra K. Swearingen, Cause ofAction to Establish Liability of Corporate Director
858
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sources, considered together, should inform decisions regarding the mix of
causes of action and particular factors justifying veil piercing claims.29
Notably, there is a sharp "schism" between nonempirical and empirical
academic theories on what kinds of causes of action and veil piercing fac-
tors will lead to success."o That schism has its origins in Robert Thomp-
son's 1991 article on veil piercing.' Thompson, analyzing over a thousand
veil piercing opinions written over the span of decades, significantly un-
derstated his findings when he wrote, "[F]actors affecting the judicial out-
come are not necessarily as suggested by previous commentary."3 2  The
novelty of his findings, combined with the elegant way they were presented,
made a lasting impact in the real world. Firms advertising their services as
incorporators rely on Thompson's work to try to lure companies to particu-
lar states. And incorporation choices reflect (and perhaps are caused by)
Thompson's ranking of the probability of veil piercing in particular juris-
dictions.34
or Officer for Corporation's Wrongful Conduct, 36 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 441, § 6 (2008) (same);
Shawn M. Flanagan, Piercing the Corporate Veil in South Carolina, S.C. LAW. MAG., Nov. 2006, at 35,
40 (citing Thompson's 1999 finding of a forty percent rate of veil piercing nationwide); Carolyn B.
Lamm, Assertion of Jurisdiction over Non-U.S. Defendants, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION 1999, at 85, 120-22 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. AO-
0030, 1999) (emphasizing the prevalence of fraud in veil piercing cases); William P. O'Neill, Advanced
Issues in Strategic Alliances, in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING & IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
2000, at 351, 395-96 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. BO-000G, 2000)
(citing Thompson's study when discussing sufficient capitalization as a factor).
29 Another factor that plaintiffs might control is the filing forum. We find no statistical evidence
that federal question and diversity cases are distinct from one another, or that cases removed from state
court are litigated in distinct ways. Although plaintiffs may choose to file in jurisdictions they perceive
to be liberal with respect to piercing, the relationship between jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules about
piercing would make this strategy risky, and the influence of jurisdiction would be, in any event, quite
difficult to test.
30 Georgakopoulos, supra note 24, at 124-30 (describing "schism").
31 Thompson, supra note 1.
32 Id. at 1038.
33 See, e.g., Corporate Service Center, Inc., Nevada v. California, http://www.corporateservice
center.com/nevada-califomia-comparison.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) (using Thompson's results to
persuade companies to incorporate in Nevada instead of California).
34 In a recent study, for example, Jens Dammann and Matthias Schuindeln analyzed 266,531 private-
ly held corporations and tested whether Thompson's ranking of veil piercing in various states motivated
entities to incorporate away from their home states. Jens Dammann & Matthias Schindeln, The Incor-
poration Choices of Privately Held Corporations 6-7 (The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Re-
search Paper No. 119, 2008), available at http://ssm.comlabstract-1049581 [hereinafter Dammann &
Schtindeln, Incorporation Choices]. They found that larger companies avoided incorporating in juris-
dictions that Thompson had identified as having a common law that was more likely to pierce. Id. at 29.
The same is apparently not true for limited liability companies. See Jens Dammann & Matthias
Schiindeln, Where Are Limited Liability Companies Formed? An Empirical Analysis 21 (The Univ. of
Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 126, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract- 1126257 (finding no statistically significant relationship between regional veil piercing rules
and LLC organization) [hereinafter Dammann & Schtndeln, Where Are Limited Liability Companies
Formed?].
859
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In the next two subsections, we lay out the strategies available to law-
yers when crafting their complaints, along with the relevant evidence that
might guide their decisions. We will use Thompson's findings as the lodes-
tar for our predictions.
1. Causes of Action.-Plaintiffs can always choose not to file a law-
suit if they think they have no realistic chance of recovery." Less often ap-
preciated is lawyers' flexibility to mold clusters of causes of actions to
maximize a lawsuit's value. For example, the distinction between common
law contract and tort creditors is often cited in academic work as a major
fault line in the law of veil piercing. 6 As plaintiffs retain the ability to
bring a similar set of facts as a tort claim, a contract claim, or both," a tac-
tical choice emerges. Most theorists believe that plaintiffs bringing causes
of action that sound in tort should be more successful than those bringing
contract cases." Tort plaintiffs have not "agreed" to assume the risk that
their claims will be defeated by a judgment proof defendant. In contrast,
contract plaintiffs were on notice that they were dealing with an entity
whose liability was limited, and therefore had the opportunity to demand (in
the contract) a premium to compensate for the extra assumed risk.
However, this theory stands in sharp contrast to the extant data, evi-
dencing the schism between doctrinal assumptions and empirical observa-
tions. According to Thompson's work, contract plaintiffs successfully
pierced at a forty-two percent rate, while tort plaintiffs successfully pierced
at a thirty-one percent rate.3 9 Although later research has failed to replicate
this result,40 it is still highlighted in academic commentary,41 casebooks,42
See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 26, at 430-31 (showing that, at least in employment dis-
crimination cases, filing rates and perceived case strength vary over time).
36 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1916-23 (1991).
37 For example, parallel theories may include a breach of contract for the failure of a warranty and a
product design tort based on strict liability.
3 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 36, at 1916-23.
39 Thompson, supra note 1, at 1058-59.
40 Hodge & Sachs, supra note 24, at 353-54 (finding contract plaintiffs successfully pierced at a
thirty-one percent rate, while tort plaintiffs successfully pierced at a thirty-six percent rate).
41 See, e.g., Rapp, supra note 24, at 1071.
42 Thus, for example, many leading casebooks for basic corporate law courses cite Thompson's
work. See, e.g., CHARLES R.T. O'KELLY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 543 (5th ed. 2006) (claiming Thompson's study produced "surprising re-
sults"); D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES PROBLEMS,
AND CASE STUDIES 209-10 (2004) (contrasting Thompson's study with theoretical predictions).
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and caselaw. 43  Lawyers' practice guides, however, are generally neutral
about whether tort or contract claims have better chances of success.'
Developing expectations about the mix of causes of action in veil
piercing complaints is a prohibitively difficult task. We lack data on the
typical background mix of causes of action because there are no large-scale
surveys of the use of causes of actions in commercial disputes. Moreover, a
structural feature of litigation, neglected in the published work to date,
makes the problem even more daunting. Parties can, and are encouraged to,
bring multiple causes of action in each complaint. Only as litigation devel-
ops, and the various causes of action are tested against the facts (Was there
really a manufacturing defect?) or the law (Did the contract satisfy the sta-
tute of frauds?), can both sides decide which causes of action are worthy of
a fact-finder's adjudication. Litigation winnows initial clusters of causes of
action to manageable contract, tort, and fraud "cases." Contrary to the con-
ventional wisdom, many plaintiffs can assert claims as both involuntary and
voluntary creditors, at least in their first-filed complaint. Ultimately, given
these factors, the conventional literature offers precious little guidance on
the distribution of causes of actions plaintiffs will file.
2. Types of Veil Piercing Allegations in Complaints.-Plaintiffs may
craft their piercing claims with strategically relevant veil piercing factors in
mind.45 In theory, plaintiffs ought to assert reasons to pierce that they be-
lieve courts will accept. For example, nonempirical scholars assert that un-
dercapitalization and fraud ought to play a particularly prominent role in
courts' decisionmaking, while informalities ought to be ignored.47 Such
academic work is largely replicated in popular practice guides and form
complaint books.4 8
43 See, e.g., Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 485 (3d Cir. 2001); Allied Capital
Corp v. GC-Sun Holdings, L.P., No. 1954-N, 2006 WL 4782243, at *14 n.55 (Del. Ch. Nov. 22, 2006);
Theberge v. Darbo, Inc., 684 A.2d 1298, 1303 n.1 (Me. 1996); D.R. Horton Inc.-N. J. v. Dynastar Dev.
L.L.C., No. MER-L-1808-00, 2005 WL 1939778, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2005).
4 See, e.g., 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 54 (2008) (omitting from a list of veil piercing factors
any mention of a difference between tort and contract claims); id. at §§ 46-52 (omitting the same from
the broader explanation of veil piercing doctrine). Others follow Thompson in discussing the difference
between tort and contract creditors. See, e.g., 45 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 1 Grounds for Disre-
garding the Corporate Entity and Piercing the Corporate Veil §§ 12-15 (1998); CAL. CIV. PRAC. Bus.
LITIG. § 5:18 (citing Thompson's 1991 finding that contract claims are more successful than tort
claims).
45 Whether notice pleading requires that plaintiffs provide such factors is a question on which jurists
may disagree. The question is related to whether failure to plead veil piercing at all serves as a waiver.
On that topic, see infra note 121.
46 See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 71-81 (1986) (noting that those veil pierc-
ing cases that are not simply substitutes for fraudulent conveyance actions often relate to undercapitali-
zation and principles of truth, primacy, and evenhandedness).
47 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 8, at 1335-36.
48 See, e.g., 45 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 1 Grounds for Disregarding the Corporate Entity and
Piercing the Corporate Veil § 9 (2008) (identifying the use of a sham corporation to perpetuate a fraud
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Thompson's empirical work on a dataset of opinions highlighted a
broader set of particularly important factors that courts used when writing
about piercing the veil.49 Figure 1, adapted directly from a frequently cited
chart in Thompson's paper, displays the success rate for each factor in opi-
nions in which the factor was mentioned.
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Figure 1: Eleven factors mentioned by courts when discussing veil piercing and the
percentage of veils pierced for each, as recorded in the Thompson 1991 study."o
as one theory of veil piercing); id. § 12 (listing and explaining undercapitalization as a major veil pierc-
ing factor); LEWIS D. SOLOMON & LEWIS J. SARET, ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES 66-92 (2009) (stat-
ing that undercapitalization may increase the likelihood of veil piercing, as may failure to follow
corporate formalities and domination and control); Lamm, supra note 28, at 120 (citing Thompson's
1991 study which showed findings of fraud in ninety percent of successful veil piercing cases); Richard
M. Lipton, Critical Partnership Tax Issues-An Overview, in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY
HELD COMPANY 411, 441-42 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. BO-
01AH, 2002) (finding that a company must be adequately capitalized at the outset, and that some cases
require adequate capitalization as business continues); O'Neill, supra note 28, at 395 (listing insufficient
capitalization as a factor).
49 Thompson, supra note 1, at 1063-65. Others have reached similar findings. See, e.g., Hodge &
Sachs, supra note 24, at 357-58.
50 Adapted from Thompson, supra note 1, at 1063 tbl. 11.
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However, a different illustration of these empirical results is availa-
ble-though it is not one highlighted either by Thompson or other empirical
scholars. If, instead of looking at the success rate of each factor where it
appears in the opinion, Thompson had considered the likelihood that a par-
ticular factor would be used as part of an opinion piercing the veil, meas-
ured against the denominator of all cases in Thompson's dataset (N=1583),
Figure 2 would have resulted:
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Figure 2: Eleven factors mentioned by courts when discussing veil piercing and
their success rate over all cases in the Thompson sample (N=1583)."
Simply changing the denominator has dramatic results. While the
common interpretation of Thompson's data, for instance, is that dominion
and control is a weak claim (because it is the least successful reason in opi-
nions piercing the veil), Figure 2 suggests that it is actually the most com-
mon factor relied on by judges when piercing. In nearly twenty percent of
the opinions in Thompson's dataset, plaintiffs successfully asserted a domi-
nion and control argument. We assume that plaintiffs' complaints will
more closely reflect the underlying distribution in Figure 2 than that in Fig-
ure 1.
5 Adapted from Thompson, supra note 1, at 1063 tbl. 11.
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B. Veil Piercing Success
Litigation containing veil piercing allegations terminates in four typical
ways: settlement, success on the merits without veil piercing, veil piercing
success on the merits, and dismissal. Scholars have focused exclusively on
the third and fourth categories, trying to tease out variables that seem to
cause courts to pierce the veil. For instance, two factors said to be impor-
tant are the kinds of veil piercing factors that courts advance as reasons in
their opinions (sham, dominion, etc.) and whether the case generally sounds
in contract or tort. Other possibilities, discussed below, include judicial
ideology, judicial demographics, and information about the organization,
wealth, and sophistication of the firm to be pierced. However, before dis-
cussing our hypotheses, we must first explain why veil piercing "suc-
cess"-or indeed any litigation outcome in district court-is hard to
quantify and analyze.
Most cases settle, and the settlement "rate" turns on many factors out-
side of the case.52 In our data, sixty-six percent of cases eventually settle. If
an analysis only looks at opinions, almost all such cases will be absent,
meaning that researchers will know nothing about those cases' veil piercing
profiles because they will not appear in their datasets." But by looking at
the entirety of the litigation, we can excavate a new kind of veil piercing
success: plaintiffs simply advancing the veil piercing claim in the litigation.
This kind of plaintiff success-which we will call "interstitial"-comes in
many forms: fighting off a defendant's motion to dismiss veil piercing alle-
gations; obtaining veil piercing-related discovery from a shareholder; keep-
ing a case in federal court on the ground that two purportedly different
parties might really be one;54 and, most importantly, surviving summary
judgment.
Interstitial successes matter for three reasons. First, they constitute
judicial application of the law of veil piercing to the facts of the case, and
reflect a determination that the shareholder's claim of immunity is not so
strong as to warrant immediate dismissal. Such successes help define what
limited liability means in practice, although motions outside of summary
judgment are rarely written up as opinions and thus rarely read by outsid-
52 Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 21, at 131-35 (noting differences between reported causes of
action and between districts).
5 See Christina L. Boyd & James F. Spriggs 11, An Examination ofStrategic Anticipation ofAppel-
late Court Preferences by Federal District Court Judges, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37,47 (2009) ("Af-
ter all, cases that are appealed and advance into each higher tier represent a non-random sample of all
cases that are litigated.").
54 See Swain & Aguilar, supra note 7, at 454 (observing that when a court decides to pierce the veil,
it is really saying that "the boundary between the corporation and its shareholders has been dissolved
and that they are acting as one.").
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ers." Previous work, ignoring the litigated life of veil piercing disputes, has
missed an important part of the picture.
Second, interstitial successes teach the parties about their judge's view
of the case.s" The Priest-Klein selection effects hypothesis implies that ra-
tional parties settle cases as the probability of winning or losing becomes
more certain." Learning through motion practice potentially will increase
the likelihood of,"8 and reduce the time to, settlement. Thus, studying in-
terstitial motions might help us understand how to dispose of cases quickly
and efficiently.
This learning-centered view of motion practice has troubling implica-
tions for analyses of resolutions at the ends of cases, as the universe of un-
settled cases will contain mostly cases where the parties' views of the me-
merits are far apart." The outcomes of such cases at trial or in late-stage
motion practice will appear to be randomly distributed, and "the formal
structure of the law [will] appear indeterminate to any scientific, empirical
method of observing judicial decisions."' In other words, quantitative stu-
55 Hoffman et al., supra note 17, at 715, 719 (noting that motions to dismiss and discovery motions
are significantly less likely to result in written opinions than are summary judgment motions).
56 Our suggestion here draws on a recently advanced real-options theory of litigation. See Joseph A.
Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58
STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1276-79 (2006). Options theory explains how parties' learning during the course
of a case will have discontinuous implications for settlement. Id. at 1279. It also suggests that parties
will settle less often than the selection effects theory predicts, because they are comparing the option
value of litigation to their expected costs, instead of their expected benefits. Id.
57 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 4-5 (1984).
58 See e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE
161, 163-64 (1986) (noting that disposition of motions is correlated with case settlement).
Priest & Klein, supra note 57, at 6.
6 Id. A broad-ranging empirical literature has grappled with the Priest-Klein hypothesis. See Da-
niel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Casesfor Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 238-41 (1996)
(reviewing and comparing studies). The theory is also quite well-developed. See, e.g., Steven Shavell,
Any Frequency ofPlaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL. STUD. 493, 500-501 (1996) (point-
ing out that when different percentages of cases proceed to trial, there are varying plaintiff win rates).
Many studies have found that actual win rates do not approach fifty percent at trial, and that this may
result from the fact that plaintiffs' initial filing decisions are also subject to selective pressure, or that
some types of plaintiffs have different stakes or capabilities in litigation. See Theodore Eisenberg &
Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON.
S92, S107-09 (1997) (controlling for a plaintiffs entity versus individual status); Theodore Eisenberg,
Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
337, 340-42 (1990) (refining the fifty percent theory and finding that it applies best to tort cases and less
to other types of litigation); Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights
and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1576-1602 (1989) (examining the effects of case type, quality
of counsel, and region, among other things, on plaintiff win rates in civil rights cases); Stewart J.
Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney
Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 719, 750-52 (1988) (explaining
that plaintiffs in constitutional torts cases may bring weaker cases to trial because they are not repeat
players).
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dies of the later stages of litigation-often, studies of opinions-should find
few relationships between independent variables and outcomes.
However, it is less clear that interstitial motions ought to be subject to
the same forces of selection. This leads to the third important role played
by studying dockets: we ought to be more confident in our ability to make
statistical predictions about the resolution of motions that do not end cases
than about the fate of the case itself."' As Margo Schlanger observed,
[T]heoretical models of litigation ... [assume that] the relevant mo-
ments/decisions are the plaintiffs' decision whether to file, the parties' deci-
sion whether to settle, and the judge's or jury's decision at trial.. .. [But, i]n
nearly every area of litigation, a case's value to the parties is very different be-
fore and after adjudication of dispositive motions (usually summary judg-
ment), as are the litigation costs and incentives. 62
Thus, we suggest that there are two basic kinds of veil piercing "success":
success on interstitial "veil piercing claim advances " motions, and success
at the case/merits level." Our arguments below about factors that might
lead to success are largely directed at the former-the temporary victories
that produce settlement-rather than the latter, as success on the merits may
be obscured by selection and settlement.' We now detail our exact predic-
tions about what ought to influence the likelihood of veil piercing success.
61 See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 545, 562 n.45 (2002) ("It is difficult to assess fully the selection bias in our sample.
Unlike Priest and Klein's binary distinction between 'litigated' cases (only those cases where a verdict is
rendered) and 'settlements' (all other cases), our sample includes a variety of legal disputes: motions to
dismiss, motions for summary judgment, new trial motions, and appeals. As such, our sample can be
viewed as multiple Priest-Klein clusters around a range of different 'decision standards."'); Kimberly D.
Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-
Theories, 91 VA. L. REv. 1795, 1877-79 (2005) (explaining why the study of success in smaller parts of
a case, like individual motions or elements of a claim, does not suffer the same degree of selection ef-
fects as the study of case-level outcomes). See generally Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics ofPretrial
Negotiation, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 93, 95-96 (1992) (developing a dynamic model of settlement choices
over time).
62 Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1555, 1595 n. 116 (2003).
63 In one recent study, Kimberly Krawiec and Kathryn Zeiler similarly concluded that courts' deci-
sions about defendants' duty to disclose information, as part of larger causes of action for fraudulent si-
lence, were predicted by a variety of independent variables. See Krawiec & Zeiler, supra note 61.
Despite some selection effects, they argued that this finding was understandable because "even when the
plaintiff can easily show that the defendant had a duty to disclose, the case nonetheless might proceed to
the litigation and opinion stage due to the parties' uncertainty about another element." Id. at 1878.
6 Thompson claimed that selection would be less likely to affect the plaintiffs in his study because
"the law in this area has not crystallized," leading plaintiffs to bring "a large number of cases." Thomp-
son, supra note 1, at 1046. He also argued that the lack of changes in the dataset over time, or across
jurisdictions, or as a result of procedure "suggested that the sample has stayed within the same broad
range." Id. at 1046-47. These arguments are fairly typical of how empirical work on opinions handles
the selection problem, and have a certain force. Our conservative position in the text highlights the
unique advantages of studying motions. See also ROBERTA ROMANO, INTERDISCIPLINARY READERS IN
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1. Entity-Specific Factors.-Several characteristics of the parties
should influence the likelihood of veil piercing success. We provide our
general predictions in this section, and later will describe the specific meas-
ures we propose to use to test each one.
a. Defendants' size.-Entity size should negatively correlate
with the likelihood of veil piercing. Small size is a proxy for being judg-
ment proof: given limited liability, small corporations will often leave
plaintiffs without a monetary remedy for their injuries. Judges are trained
in a tradition that does not ordinarily separate rights from remedies, mean-
ing judges will be motivated to let plaintiffs proceed further with their veil
piercing claims against smaller companies. More importantly, judges are
unlikely to perceive very small companies to be independent legal entities,
deserving of the special protections afforded by the veil. A company with a
handful of employees will look much like a sole proprietorship, while a
company with significantly more employees will look much more perma-
nent. Whatever the content of the formal rules, courts will be reluctant to
grant immunity to entities that appear to be the mere extensions of individ-
uals. Notably, this factor will often be observable by judges, but is unlikely
to show up in formal doctrine, except to the extent that it might interact
with formal factors like informalities and entity legal status. We would ex-
pect it to play a significant role in judicial decisions on piercing.
b. Defendants' entity choice.-Second, we predict that limited
liability companies will be less likely to be subject to piercing motions than
corporations. Most LLC statutes provide that LLC members and managers
are not liable for the acts, debts, or obligations of the LLC merely by reason
of being a member or manager. While there is some variance among the
states' statutory approaches to whether to allow LLC veil piercing," pre-
vious scholarship, focusing on published opinions, has found that member
liability protection is not measurably different from state to state." This
work also has found little difference in the liability protections of LLCs
LAW: FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 83 (1993) (noting the selection bias issue in Thompson's
study).
65 The four main approaches are: (1) no affirmative statement that veil piercing applies, but a note
that failure to observe formalities is not grounds for personal liability (followed in Hawaii, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Montana, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia); (2) a
statement that corporate veil piercing applies except for failure to observe formalities (followed in Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, and Washington); (3) a statement that corporate veil piercing
applies without explicit limitations (followed in Florida, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin); and
(4) silence (followed in thirty states).
66 Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, supra note 14, at 80-81. See 2 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN &
ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 12:3 n.3.50
(West 2008) (listing several dozen LLC veil piercing cases purporting to apply corporate standards);
Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1, 7 (1997).
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compared to the corporate form." We expect, however, that when veil
piercing activity is examined beyond just opinions, this additional statutory
protection will translate into an overall lower likelihood of successful pierc-
ing for LLCs than for corporations and other business structures. The rea-
son is simple: corporations, unlike LLCs, are ordinarily expected to follow
a series of corporate formalities (like the separation of ownership from con-
trol) which are more difficult to achieve in smaller firms than in larger ones.
Since, as we discuss below, our dataset is dominated by small firms, this
difference should cause courts to see relatively more corporations as failing
to follow the law.
c. Defendants' shareholder identity.-We also expect that enti-
ties owned by individuals (rather than corporations) will be more likely to
be pierced. In his work, Thompson found just that." This makes sense on
many levels: corporate shareholders are more likely to appear in more so-
phisticated, wealthier firms; and the test for consolidation among firms, of-
ten litigated as a veil piercing claim in disguise, is stricter than that for
piercing alone.
d. Defendants' business lawyering.-We predict that firms rich
in legal formalities will be less likely to be successfully pierced. Recent
opinions seem to indicate that courts are sometimes willing to allow entities
"to operate with a minimum of formality."" However, the presence of legal
formalities, like holding regular meetings, having a complete board book,
keeping separate bank accounts, and documenting distributions, is likely to
positively influence the disposition of veil piercing cases, particularly when
such formalities are pervasive.
e. Plaintifs' claims.-We hypothesize that cases involving in-
voluntary creditors will be more likely to be successful on veil piercing
claims. Conversely, cases with voluntary creditors are less likely to be suc-
cessful.70 Here, we follow existing theory which distinguishes between in-
voluntary creditors (like tort victims) who are not on notice about limited
liability and voluntary creditors (like disappointed promisees) who are."t
Because of the cause of action clustering problem we discuss above, we
67 Thompson, supra note 66, at 7; Rapp, supra note 24, at 1063-64.
68 Thompson, supra note 1, at 1054-56.
69 Harvey Gelb, Limited Liability Policy and Veil Piercing, 9 Wyo. L. REv. 551, 554-55 (2009); see
also Millon, supra note 8, at 1335 (noting that while "[s]ome courts have held that nonobservance [of
corporate formalities] by itself is not enough to warrant veil piercing[,] [o]ther courts treat it as sufficient
if the nonobservance is extensive").
70 Because of the complex clustering of causes of action in complaints, our inquiry into the effects
of these types of causes of action is rudimentary in nature, and thus preliminary. In future work, we
hope to better understand and model the complex cause of action content of veil piercing complaints.
71 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 36, at 1916-23 (describing the differences between invo-




discount empirical data finding (contrary to theory) that contract creditors
win more often than tort creditors do.72 Further, we will expand our analy-
sis beyond the traditional "tort" and "contract" categories by directly identi-
fying "involuntary" and "voluntary" causes of action.
f. Veil piercing grounds.-It is our expectation that the strength
of the grounds for veil piercing asserted in plaintiffs' complaints will corre-
late with later veil piercing success. Claims that correlate strong factual
records with factors that traditional doctrine deems important will be more
likely to lead to success. Thus, undercapitalization, fraud, informalities,
misrepresentation, intertwining, and dominion and control ought to corre-
late with veil piercing success. More conclusory allegations like alter ego,
fagade, shell, dummy, and agency ought to have no effect or should be ne-
gatively correlated with success. Following a well-established theory in the
literature, we further hypothesize that the following traditional veil piercing
factors should be less important in the LLC context than they are in the cor-
porate context: (1) failure to observe formalities, (2) inadequate capitaliza-
tion,74 and (3) dominion and control."
2. Judicial Characteristics (with Some Notes on Motivation).-In an
area of law as notoriously indeterminate as that of veil piercing, the identi-
ty, background, and views of the trial judge may play an important role in
the resolution of any motion as well as in the ultimate disposition. There-
fore, we review the possible theoretical functions of judicial ideology, sex,
and race. We also discuss the potential hierarchical control that circuit
courts wield over district court judges' decisionmaking in these matters.
a. Judicial ideology.-We expect that liberal trial judges will be
more likely to pierce the veil than conservative judges. Ideological judging
72 See discussion infra Part I.A. 1.
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 66, § 12.3.
74 STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 4.2 (stating that "failure to abide by cor-
porate formalities, domination by an owner, and undercapitalization, might yield inequitable results
when applied as tests for the piercing of the veil of limited liability companies"); Bainbridge, Abolishing
LLC Veil Piercing, supra note 14, at 90 (arguing that undercapitalization is an insufficient basis for cor-
porate veil piercing, and should also be considered insufficient in the LLC context).
7 Scholars argue that because LLC statutes explicitly allow members to manage LLCs, piercing by
virtue of manager control is particularly inappropriate. See Jeffrey K. Vandervoort, Piercing the Veil of
Limited Liability Companies: The Need for a Better Standard, 3 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 51, 70-72
(2004). Instead, domination and control, if it is an applicable factor to LLCs, must involve the question
of whether the member was using the LLC to accomplish purely personal goals. PRESSER, supra note
74, § 4.2. Opinions are split. Compare D.R. Horton, Inc.-N. J. v. Dynastar Dev., LLC, No. MER-L-
1808-00, 2005 WL 1939778, at *35 (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2005) (finding the dominance and control
factor should be given less weight because it conflicts with the underlying policy of flexibility within the
LLC statute) with Double Constr. Co., LLC v. Advanced Home Builders, LLC, No. CV065003609,
2008 WL 4050864, at *4 (Conn. Super. Aug. 6, 2008) (finding the necessary factor of domination satis-
fied in two-member LLC because the members controlled all aspects of the transaction with plaintiffs).
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theory is based on a very long line of judicial decisionmaking literature."
This scholarship has found that judges often make decisions that are consis-
tent with their ideological preferences. These findings have held true across
the federal judicial hierarchy, with empirical work finding that district and
circuit court judges and Supreme Court Justices make many decisions in an
ideologically consistent fashion."
In an important work on ideological voting in the federal appellate
courts, Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman hypothesized that judges would treat
veil piercing decisions like other forms of legal analysis and conform their
decisions to their ideological inclinations.78 They found that decisions in-
volving the veil, just like those involving affirmative action, sex discrimina-
tion, sexual harassment, race discrimination, and environmental regulations,
were motivated by ideological disagreement." Republican appellate judges
voted for the plaintiff in veil piercing cases at a lower rate than democratic
appointees (twenty-seven percent to forty-one percent).o Confirming the
effects of judicial panels, sixty-seven percent of all-Democratic panels
voted with veil piercing plaintiffs, while only twenty-three percent of all-
Republican panels were so generous."'
That we assume that judicial ideology will play an important role in
decisions about veil piercing does not mean we have resolved the mechan-
ism producing this effect. The political science ideology thesis suggests
ideology furnishes judges with a non-legal basis-ideological commit-
ments-on which to make legal decisions, and that judges are conscious of
that basis. A distinct theory of judicial motivation, developed most notably
by Dan Kahan, Don Braman, and their co-authors, is cultural cognition.82
Cultural cognition theory posits that judges are likely to unconsciously in-
76 See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE
ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963 (1965); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
n See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 76, at 6-12 (finding that Supreme Court Justices' deci-
sions are ideologically motivated); Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek,
Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48
AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 133 (2004) (finding that ideological disagreement among circuit court judges is an
important predictor of dissent); C.K. Rowland, Robert A. Carp & Ronald A. Stidham, Judges'Policy
Choices and the Value Basis ofJudicial Appointments, 46 J. POL. 886, 898 (1984) (finding that the party
of the appointing president is an important predictor of district court judge decisionmaking).
78 Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts
of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 304 (2004) (predicting ideological voting
on veil piercing issues).
7 Id at 321.
80 Id
81 Id.
82 See The Cultural Cognition Project, www.culturalcognition.net (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). This
general description of the theory of cultural cognition was adapted from Dan M. Kahan, David A.
Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841-43 (2009).
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terpret the facts to fit their cultural evaluations of putatively dangerous be-
havior."
Cultural cognition theory thus offers a contrasting story about why a
judge's ideology might matter in a veil piercing lawsuit. Cultural cognition
theorists believe that judges' ideological commitments are unconscious ex-
pressions of their cultural makeup, loosely organized around views about
private ordering and hierarchy, rather than consciously imposed extra-legal
biases. Judges' cultural mindsets, then, will change how judges view the
facts themselves. Judges will approach purportedly neutral factual veil
piercing inquiries (was there commingling, did the shareholders "dominate"
the corporation, and so forth) in light of their underlying values. Those val-
ues, in turn, are shaped by distinctive risk judgments, including the entre-
preneurial benefits supposedly accruing from limited liability and the risks
to the plaintiff and to society resulting from the lack of remedy for legal
harms. Individuals of different cultural predispositions will therefore hold
different views about the value of limited liability and subconsciously will
mold their understandings of relevant veil piercing facts to fit them.
In the experimental world, we might be able to test these competing
hypotheses about how and why political attitudes matter by: (1) gathering
data about the determinants of cultural world views; and (2) comparing the
performance of those determinants to the attitudinal thesis." But given the
nature of the data we can collect, proxies must suffice; we cannot ask the
judges presiding over our veil piercing cases about their cultural styles, and
if we did, we could not necessarily rely on their answers." Similarly,
measures of judicial ideology are noisy and imprecise, largely because they
rely on presidential preferences and the norm of senatorial courtesy." Of
course, as a "subconscious influence on cognition,"" cultural cognition may
complement, not contradict, ideologically motivated predictions." Thus,
83 See Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A Cultural
Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1083-87 (2006) (book review).
8 Kahan and Braman have used structural equation modeling in the self-defense context to test
these competing hypotheses in nonjudicial experimental subjects, finding support for the cultural cogni-
tion (as opposed to values-based decisionmaking) model. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The
Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 44-46 (2008). Whether such a result
would hold with judicial subjects is unknown.
8s In a way, this is perhaps just as well, as the authors are not in agreement about the relative supe-
riority of the competing hypotheses. Boyd, a political scientist, prefers attitudinal and strategy-based
models; Hoffman, a member of the cultural cognition project, does not.
86 See infra notes 127-132 and accompanying text. Also factoring into this imprecision is the pres-
ence of local culture and norms that may influence ideology. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Environmental
Constraints on the Behavior ofJudges: A Representational Model ofJudicial Decision Making, 14 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 343, 358-60 (1980).
87 Dan M. Kahan, 'Ideology in' vs. 'Cultural Cognition of' Law: What Diference Does It Make? 5
(Yale Law School, Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 180, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-l 11865.
8 Id. at 5-8.
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our data do not permit us to test either the cultural cognition or the political
science ideology models directly. Although we are comfortable predicting
that liberal judges will be more likely to advance veil piercing cases than
conservative judges, confirmation of this finding will not answer the ques-
tion of motivation.
b. Judicial gender.-We expect that female judges, all else
equal, will be more likely than male judges to be sympathetic to veil pierc-
ing plaintiffs. A large body of literature, both empirical and theoretical in
nature, argues that female judges bring a unique perspective to the bench
that could affect decisionmaking and other behavior." The theoretical
groundings for this work are diverse, 0 ranging from the "different voice"
that females possess based on their societal upbringing,9' to their roles as
representatives of women as a class,92 to the unique information they have
based on their professional backgrounds." The empirical work in this area
has found that female judges sometimes, but not always, reach different me-
rits decisions than their male counterparts," and that female judges some-
times behave differently when it comes to managing their cases and making
nonmerits decisions.95 Applying these theories to veil piercing cases, the
conventional accounts that correlate being female with values like egalita-
rianism and equality," while not a perfect fit, would seem to disfavor de-
fendants asserting the virtues of limited liability. Female judges in
89 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 128-50 (1982); Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse
Bench in the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 598, 610-15 (2003); Patricia Yancey Martin, John
R. Reynolds & Shelley Keith, Gender Bias and Feminist Consciousness Among Judges and Attorneys: A
Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27 SIGNs 665, 668-69 (2002).
90 These (often competing) theories are synthesized in greater detail in Christina L. Boyd, Lee Eps-
tein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. (forth-
coming 2010). We review them only briefly here.
91 See GILLIGAN, supra note 89, at 5-23.
92 See Beverly B. Cook, Will Women Judges Make a Diference in Women's Legal Rights? A Pre-
diction from Attitudes and Simulated Behavior, in WOMEN, POWER AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS 224-25,
227 (Margherita Rendel ed., 1981); Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, State High Courts and Divorce: The
Impact ofJudicial Gender, 36 U. TOL. L. Rev. 923, 930 (2005).
See Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L. J. 1759, 1764, 1774 (2005).
94 See Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 90, for a comprehensive review of the empirical studies
and their findings in this area.
9 See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Herbert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the
Judge's Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 Soc. FORCES 1163, 1174 (1999)
(finding that female judges are more likely to incarcerate offenders and to impose longer prison sen-
tences); Christina L. Boyd, She'll Settle It: Judges, Their Sex, and the Disposition of Cases in Federal
District Courts (Jan. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://clboyd.net/shellsettleit.pdf
(finding that female district court judges are more likely to have the cases on their dockets settle than
their male colleagues).
96 See Melissa L. Finucane, Paul Slovic, C.K. Mertz, James Flynn & Theresa A. Satterfield, Gender,
Race, and Perceived Risk: The 'White Male'Effect, 2 HEALTH, RISK, AND SOc'Y 159, 170 (2000).
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particular, because of their "experiences as relative outsiders in the legal
profession[,] [may] have ... independent or distinctively empathetic pers-
pectives"' that could lead to a greater likelihood of veil piercing of entity
structures."
c. Judicial race.-We anticipate that minority judges will be
more likely to preside over successful veil piercings than their white coun-
terparts. As with judicial gender, theories of the possible effects of race on
case management and decisionmaking are plentiful. Those that argue that
black judges will rule differently than their white counterparts do so based
on black judges' representation interests" or different backgrounds and ex-
periences. As Darrell Steffensmeier and Chester L. Britt put it, "[b]ecause
they have grown up and lived as 'blacks,' black judges are likely to have
some perspectives and are responsive to some constituencies different from
those of white judges."'o Empirically, scholars have found some, but not
universal, support for race-based differences."o Racial minority judges may
have more experience than white judges with the problem of remedy-less
rights and abuse of legal formalities. Thus, in the veil piercing context,
they may be more likely to believe that individuals have abused the corpo-
rate form. As with female judges, the distribution of ideologies of minority
James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Un-
ions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 1675, 1688-89
(1999).
98 The ideology of female judges in the federal judiciary is unevenly distributed (in the liberal direc-
tion), whereas male judges are far more distributed across the ideological spectrum. Because of this,
any effect for sex must be parsed out from a possibly confounding ideological effect. For more on this,
as well as general theory and empirical work surrounding the sex of judges and its effect on decision-
making, see generally Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 90.
99 Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 AM. J. POL. SC.
884, 885 (1978); Susan Welch, Michael Combs & John Gruhl, Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32
AM. J. POL. Sc. 126, 127 (1988).
1oo Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L. Britt, Judges'Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black
Judges Sentence Differently?, 82 Soc. SCI. Q. 749, 752 (2001).
lot See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 42-45 (2008) (finding large racially-based differences in judging remedial provisions of the Voting
Rights Act); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judi-
cial Mind: An Empirical Study ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1457-59 (1998) (finding
race effects). But see Kathryn Abrams, Black Judges and Ascriptive Group Identification, in NORMS
AND THE LAW 208, 214-16 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) (finding that race is not a reliable determinant);
Steffensmeier & Britt, supra note 100, at 761-62 (finding only some evidence that black judges' actions
were affected by their backgrounds); Uhlman, supra note 99, at 888-91 (reporting little race-based dif-
ference in judging behavior observed).
873
104:853 (2010)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
judges in the federal judiciary skews to the left,'02 so it remains important to
differentiate any race effects from those inherently linked to ideology."'
d. Appellate court control.-We expect that district court judges
serving under a liberal circuit court will be more likely to pierce the veil
than district judges serving in a conservative circuit. While judges bring
their preferences to the bench, they do not make decisions in political isola-
tion. For Supreme Court Justices, this means considering external political
factors such as pressures exerted by Congress, the President, and the pub-
lic.'" For lower court judges, even more constraining forces are in play due
to the judicial hierarchy.'0
Despite these possibly conflicting forces, district court judges should
be most compelled to follow the preferences of their immediate superior,
the circuit court of appeals. The reasons for this are twofold. First, as
Lindquist and Haire note, judicial agents "might be expected to weigh more
heavily the preferences of those principals who exercise direct supervisory
control over their activities.""' Second, the modern Supreme Court's ap-
pellate supervisory role has diminished. The Supreme Court has been
102 See Jennifer A. Segal, The Decision Making of Clinton's Nontraditional Judicial Appointees 80
JUDICATURE 279 (1997) (noting that many of the minority judges in the federal judiciary were appointed
by Presidents Carter and Clinton and support minority issues).
103 Cf Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 90 , at 12-14 (arguing that gender and ideology effects
must be statistically disentangled, particularly in the federal judiciary where most female judges are also
liberals).
104 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 372-89 (1991); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldiera & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Mea-
suring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court 47 AM. J. POL. Sci. 354, 364 (2003) (describ-
ing the public's "'running tally' about [the Supreme Court]-a sort of historical summary of the good
and bad things [it] has done").
los District courts face a difficult situation of having multiple principals. As Susan Haire and her
co-authors put it,
District judges may find themselves "trying to please two masters" when the preferences of their
circuit superiors are at odds with those of the Supreme Court. And while the Supreme Court gen-
erally does not have direct sanctioning authority over the district court, the Supreme Court's
judgments influence those of the district court's immediate superior in important ways.
Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal
Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 143, 148 (2003).
106 Stefanie A. Lindquist & Susan B. Haire, Decision Making by an Agent with Multiple Principals:
Environmental Policy in the US. Courts ofAppeals, in INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 230, 237 (James R. Rogers et al. eds., 2006). When considering courts of appeals as agents of
the Supreme Court and Congress, Lindquist and Haire note that they "expect the Supreme Court's effect
to be magnified because of its supervisory role over the appeals courts in the federal judicial hierarchy."
Id. at 238; see also James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236, 254-55 (1999) (finding support for the claim that courts of appeals act as
agents of the Supreme Court and finding limited support for the argument that the courts of appeals also
act as agents of Congress).
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granting certiorari to fewer than 100 cases each year,'o7 so "the U.S. Courts
of Appeals have become the de facto (if not the de jure) venue for final ap-
pellate review."'o
When making decisions, although district court judges will want to ex-
ercise their ideological preferences and advance their political agendas, they
also will "want to know if their opinions and directives are going to be res-
pected and, generally speaking, [will] want to avoid reversal."'" Kirk Ran-
dazzo's 2008 study uncovered empirical evidence that district courts temper
their ideological decisionmaking in anticipation of the actions of the super-
vising courts of appeals."0 Applied to the veil piercing context, this means
that circuit court judges' ideological preferences, which should mirror those
discussed above with regard to district court judges, should also be ac-
counted for in any district court decision that is subject to review and possi-
ble reversal.
In summary, legal realism tempers the ambition of empirically based
studies of litigation. It discounts the likelihood that the formal rules of law
are doing their perceived work in molding the resolution of disputes. This
Article takes a realistic approach to piercing disputes and challenges the
suggestion in the existing literature that the reasons that judges provide in
opinions reflect the underlying reality of veil piercing litigation. Given
claim selection and individual judicial characteristics, we expect to find on-
ly modest relationships between any independent variables and veil piercing
outcomes at the merits level of a veil piercing case. However, we do expect
to find that judicial characteristics, case characteristics, and information
about the party or parties to be pierced will bear significantly on the likelih-
ood that a plaintiff will achieve interstitial successes.
107 See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth & Thomas G. Walker, THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM 68-73 (3d ed. 2003); see also Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist
Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 402, 403-4 (arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure led to a steady
decline in the Court's docket size).
108 VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A
COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 89 (2006); see also JoHN
C. HUGHES, THE FEDERAL COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 40 (1995) (arguing that it is ap-
propriate for the intermediate appellate courts to be the major shapers of legal policy).
109 Boyd & Spriggs, supra note 53, at 47. But see David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear ofRe-
versal as an Explanation ofLower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 579,600 (2003) (finding
that fear of reversal was not a major influence on the cases examined in their data). District court judges
also may be influenced by the prestige of certain circuit judges. See David Klein & Darby Morrisroe,
The Prestige and Influence ofIndividual Judges on the US. Courts ofAppeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371,
390-91 (1999) (finding that some circuit court judges enjoy more prestige than others and therefore may
exert more influence over other courts' decisionmaking).
110 Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in the US. District
Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 669 (2008).
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II. A DISTINCT APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF LITIGATION
A. Why Study Dockets?
Many recent articles have analyzed datasets of opinions and drawn sta-
tistically-based conclusions about the determinants and effects of legal doc-
trine."' Such studies are illustrative of general doctrinal trends, and, more
specifically, shed light on how judges choose to explain themselves in pub-
lished opinions. They typically proceed by gathering a sample of opinions
collected from the Westlaw or Lexis database and engage in content analy-
sis.'l2
This method constitutes the existing work on veil piercing, both in the
United States and abroad. However, it is flawed for reasons that we have
explored at length in previous work."' Opinions do not represent the un-
iverse of what trial judges do. One study estimated that collectively judges
write opinions for only three percent of the orders they issue in litigation,"4
and for only sixteen percent of the orders in which they apply facts to
law."' Worse, opinions are systematically biased: they arise later in litiga-
tion (discovery orders and denials of motions to dismiss are underrepre-
sented among reported opinions)."' Moreover, judges may write opinions
more often at moments when they fear appellate review-that is, when they
are departing from precedent:
If the law we read from trial courts results from risk aversion, perhaps opinions
appear when judges attempt to vary precedent rather than abide by it. In such
circumstances, after all, appellate review and reversal is probably more likely
than the norm. For example, imagine a court decides to deny discovery when
in comparable circumstances she usually grants it. Might she do so through an
opinion on the theory that it is the extraordinary case that will face appellate
Ill See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equi-
valents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 963 (2007) (collecting opinions, including 217 from the district courts,
and performing content analysis); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of US. Copyright Fair Use Opi-
nions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 554 (2008) (analyzing a data set of all reported federal opi-
nions from 1978 to 2005 which substantially invoked Section 107 of the Copyright Act); Sean M.
McEldowney, New Insights on the "Death" of Obviousness: An Empirical Study of District Court Ob-
viousness Opinions, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 7, available at stlr.stanford.edu/pdflMcEldowney-
Obviousness.pdf (analyzing a data set of five years of district court opinions); Wendy Parker, The De-
cline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1623, 1628-29 n.36 (2003) (analyzing school desegregation opinions).
112 See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96
CAL. L. REV. 63, 122 (2008) ("[C]ontent analysis forms the basis for a uniquely legal empirical metho-
dology.").
"3 See Hoffman et al., supra note 17; Christina L. Boyd, The Impact of Courts of Appeals on Subs-
tantive and Procedural Success in the Federal District Courts 12 (July 14, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1434076.
114 Hoffman et al., supra note 17, at 710.
115 Id. at 720. Notably, this work was limited to four districts, picked for their relative typicality.
116 Id. at 720-21.
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scrutiny? Qualitative students of trial court opinions may read a hundred dis-
covery decisions, never realizing that each one runs counter to the larger flow-
ing tide."'
This theory remains unproven, but veil piercing litigation provides a
good opportunity to test it. Analyzing veil piercing from the perspective of
dockets, rather than opinions, permits us to see the interstitial litigation
moments that give content to the legal right to limited liability. This tech-
nique allows us to answer questions: How long will the litigation take?
How much will it cost (measured by how many orders it produces)? Do at-
torneys' characteristics matter? How will discovery proceed? When will
settlement likely occur? How will the court rule on motions in limine? Are
transfer motions welcomed? When should the parties move for summary
judgment?
B. Data and Measures
1. Data.-To test our hypotheses, we developed a database of 690
federal district court cases involving veil piercing claims, filed in seventy-
nine districts from 2000 to 2005."' These 690 cases represent an eighty-
seven percent simple random sample of all eligible veil piercing cases with-
in this time period. Using Westlaw's Trial Pleadings database,"' we
searched for pleadings involving veil piercing claims from federal district
court cases.120 1Through this technique of identifying a body of cases for
117 Id. at 732.
118 The districts with no cases represented in the final data are: Central District of Illinois, District
of Alaska, District of Guam, District of Idaho, District of Montana, District of New Mexico, District of
North Dakota, District of Northern Mariana Islands, District of Puerto Rico, District of Rhode Island,
District of the Virgin Islands, Eastern District of Oklahoma, Western District of Arkansas, Western Dis-
trict of Tennessee, and Western District of Texas.
119 As described by Westlaw, the Trial Pleadings Database has coverage beginning in 2000 and in-
cludes "selected pleadings, complaints, and answers filed in state and federal courts." Westlaw, Plead-
ings database content, http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/default.aspx?db-PLEADING&RP=/scope/
default.wl&RS=WLW10.03&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=-top&MT=Westlaw&MST= (last visited Oct.
12, 2010). Conversations with Westlaw research representatives indicate that for veil piercing cases,
this database covers or nearly covers the universe of federal claims. In particular, although not for spe-
cific attribution, a Westlaw representative with supervisory responsibilities over the PLEADINGS data-
base said that it was designed to collect all federal complaints since 2000 that lawyers litigating
commercial cases would have a plausible interest in learning about. Thus, PLEADINGS may exclude
civil rights cases, or habeas petitions, or family disputes, but attempts to collect every tort, contract, or
federal statutory claim brought against corporate defendants. With respect to State complaints, which
may or may not be electronically filed, West currently collects material from larger urban centers, and
consequently does not have comprehensive records from smaller jurisdictions.
120 WL Pleadings search: ("alter ego liability" or pier! fs corpor! Is veil or "unity of interest" or
(corpor! /s (facade or shell or sham or undercapitalized conduit)) and da(aft 01/01/2000) and da(bef
01/01/2006)). The search yielded some cases that were extraneous to our study, including six cases with
a contingency veil piercing pleading, see, e.g., Civil Complaint Jury Trial Demanded, Schuster v. Chat-
tern Inc., No. 04-882, 2004 WL 2976589, *4 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ("In the event any parties are mis-
named or not included herein, it is the Plaintiffs contention that such a misnomer and/or such parties
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study based on the contents of the pleadings, we were able to capture nearly
all cases where piercing is in dispute because, generally speaking, parties
must plead veil piercing or waive the right to assert such claims in the liti-
gation. 2'
are/were 'alter egos' of parties named herein. Alternatively, Plaintiff contends that such 'corporate
veils' should be pierced to hold such parties properly included in the interest ofjustice."), and five cases
with reverse piercing claims.
121 Our research indicates that requiring the pleading of a piercing claim (including in amendments)
is the majority rule. See, e.g., Scully v. US Wats, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 515-16 (3d Cir. 2001) (waiver
when not pled); Allen v. United Props. & Const., Inc., No. 07-214, 2008 WL 4080035, at *12-13 (D.
Colo. Sept. 3, 2008) (construing a pro se plaintiff's complaint liberally but acknowledging that waiver
was usually appropriate when a claim was not made in pleading); Sudamax Industria e Comercio de Ci-
garros Ltda. v. Buttes & Ashes, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 2d 841, 847 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (acknowledging that
veil piercing must be pled in the complaint, but assuming it can be inferred from the complaint and ana-
lyzing whether there is an issue of material fact regardless); Luyster v. Textron, Inc., No, 06-4166, 2007
WL 1792505, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2007) (requiring amendment before advancing veil piercing
argument); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Recovery Express, Inc., 415 F, Supp. 2d 6, 10 n.3 (D. Mass. 2006)
(waiver); Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1067 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (general waiver rule waived due to short time period since filing); Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194
F.R.D. 348, 366 n.33 (D. Me. 2000) (waiver); Koblosh v. Adelsick, No. 95-5209, 1996 WL 745390, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1996) (waiver); Quinn v. Workforce 2000, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 131, 135 (E.D. Tex.
1995) (waiver); Forester & Jerue, Inc. v. Daniels, 409 So. 2d 830, 832 (Ala. 1982) (waiver); Devlin v.
Ne. Mortgage Corp., No. 0301786705, 2006 WL 1390834, at *6 (Conn. Super. May 2, 2006) (waiver);
Palm Bay Towers Corp. v. Brooks, 466 So. 2d 1071, 1073-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (waiver) Kan-
sas Comm'n on Civil Rights v. Service Envelope Co., Inc., 660 P.2d 549, 555 (Kan. 1983) (waiver).
The minority rule, however, does seem to allow plaintiffs to first argue piercing claims at trial or in
the jury instructions if the defendants have notice. See, e.g., Fountain Lakes Assocs., L.P. v. Red River
Roofing & Restoration, Inc., No. 02-2193, 2007 WL 2746702, at *10 n.10 (W.D. La. Sept. 17, 2007)
(waiver if not pled in complaint or pre-trial order); Gill v. Byers Chevrolet LLC, No. 05-982, 2006 WL
2460873, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2006) (need only allege facts, not the words "veil piercing" or "alter
ego," to preserve claim); Kimsey v. Akstein, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1302 n.14 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (no
waiver with notice); McCormick v. City of Dillingham, 16 P.3d 735, 743 (Alaska 2001) (alter ego claim
not waived when defendants had notice); Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 748-50 (Minn. 1997) (no
waiver if facts provide notice); Fischer v. Brancato, 147 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (no
waiver under Missouri UFTA if the statutory cause of action is properly pled). Thus, we expect that
there may be two kinds of cases generally missing from our dataset: failed attempts to add veil piercing
claims in waiver jurisdictions and successful attempts in lenient jurisdictions.
There are two further points to explore regarding waiver and the sources of law. First, with respect
to certain federal causes of action, federal courts may be developing a distinct federal common law of
veil piercing. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9 (1998) (holding open the question of
whether under CERCLA there ought to be a federal common law of veil piercing). However, we find no
statistically significant relationship between federal causes of action and veil piercing success. Second,
one might imagine that federal courts could, under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), treat the
veil piercing waiver rule as procedural, and thus trumped by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, our research discloses no examples of federal courts ignoring state waiver rules on Erie
grounds when analyzing state-based veil piercing claims. Generally speaking, the application of Erie to
state-based waiver standards, and further to the scope of federal common law veil piercing, raises some
serious and interesting constitutional issues that are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595 (2008) (arguing that Erie poses no cogniza-
ble constitutional limits to the scope of federal common law making).
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Our sample remains imperfect, despite its improvement upon existing
empirical studies. First, we did not collect information about cases filed in
state court that were not removed to federal court. We are able to control
this potential bias in two ways: (1) by comparing diversity and federal ques-
tion cases, and (2) by controlling for the presence of cases that were re-
moved from a state court prior to the federal court proceedings. We discuss
each of these in greater detail below. While no veil piercing study to date
has found a difference between state and federal cases, it is at least possible
that state court veil piercing cases proceed in a distinct manner. We assume
that such state cases are more likely to involve smaller stakes and less so-
phisticated and less wealthy parties. Only as state courts begin to systemat-
ically make their court documents electronically available will docket-based
empirical research be able to encompass state litigation. Second, we ex-
cluded cases where complaints or dockets are not electronically availa-
blel 22-moStly older cases-and cases involving multidistrict litigation.123
Despite these exclusions, we feel confident that ours is the most com-
prehensive and systematic dataset of veil piercing litigation yet assembled.
It consists of 690 cases, alleging that the veils of 870 entities ought to be
pierced, and involves over 1000 veil piercing and non-veil piercing mo-
tions.124  For each case, we coded from the pleadings, the docket, and any
other relevant case documents attached to the docket.125 After retrieving the
122 We dropped fifty-seven cases from our sample because of a lack of a complaint or other key
case documents. We also dropped cases that had duplicates or consolidated matches in the data (79) or
were really state court cases (9). We also dropped several cases that failed to assert cognizable veil
piercing claims. For example, a number of pro se plaintiffs asserted patently frivolous claims seeking to
pierce the veil of the United States. Apparently, such complaints follow a form provided by "The Court
Watcher" website, http://thecourtwatcher.com. See Posting of Dave Hoffman to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/07/odditiesfrom d_1.html (July 7, 2008, 13:08).
123 Ninety-three cases involved in multidistrict litigation were dropped from our sample. Because
these cases involve numerous judges, parties, districts, and often years of litigation, they pose tremend-
ous coding and analysis challenges. More importantly, because these cases are simply not comparable
to the other cases within our data, we believe that our decision to drop them is justifiable.
124 While previous studies, like Thompson's, were advantaged by longitudinal breadth-(he ex-
amined opinions available on Westlaw from 1930 to 1985 and found 1600 corporate law cases with veil
piercing issues)-only 647 of his observations are federal cases (trial and appellate combined) and only
401 are trial court cases (state and federal combined). Over this extended period of time, Thompson was
able to analyze just a few federal district court piercing cases each year. See Thompson, supra note 1, at
1044 n.47 ("The earliest date of the cases varied depending on the breadth of the various Westlaw libra-
ries; there were almost no cases prior to 1930 and only a handful each year until the mid-1950s."). In
contrast, our study has an average of nearly 200 federal district court cases per year, a tremendous in-
crease no matter the measure one chooses.
125 Our data collection from these documents focuses on case and party information that is critical
to understanding the evolution of piercing claims and the outcome of those claims in a case. For exam-
ple, we coded: judge and magistrate name; district name and office number; causes of action in all com-
plaints and amended complaints; basic case information (nature of suit, type of jurisdiction, jury
demand); method by which case terminated; information on every party, including their status and type;
where a party is a business defendant, the company's state of incorporation or organization, and its type
(e.g., close, family, public); where a party is an individual defendant, whether he or she was a manager;
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primary pleading from Westlaw, we turned to PACER (Public Access to
Court Electronic Resources) to retrieve the case docket and other case doc-
uments. As with Westlaw's Trial Pleadings Database, PACER and many of
its federal district court case documents are generally useful only from 2000
onward.1 6
2. Common Measures.-To test our hypotheses, we rely on a number
of common covariates:
a. Judge ideology.-Judge ideology, a variable in each of our
multivariate models, is measured using the Judicial Common Space (JCS)
scores. JCS Scores are coded using the methodology first described by
Giles and co-authors,127 and later implemented, expanded, and made public-
ly available by Epstein and colleagues.128 In coding these scores for our da-
ta, we relied on the NOMINATE Common Space scores.129 If an appointed
judge has at least one home state senator from the same party as his or her
appointing president, the judge receives the NOMINATE score from that
senator (or, if both senators are from the president's party, their average
score).' If, however, both senators are from the opposite party of the pres-
ident, the judge receives the president's NOMINATE score."' JCS scores
have a theoretical range from -1 to 1, with -1 being the most liberal and I
being the most conservative. 3 2 Within our data, judge ideology ranges from
-0.625 to 0.702.
For the cases in the dataset where the only assigned judge in the case is
a magistrate judge rather than a district court judge (due to the consent of
the parties), we took an additional step to capture ideology."' Unlike Ar-
ticle III district court judges, magistrates are neither life-tenured nor ap-
pointed through the federal political process. Rather, magistrates generally
serve eight-year terms after being elected by a majority vote of the judges in
their district.'34 Since magistrates are selected in this way, we coded the
grounds for piercing claims; and, for every piercing activity, stage of case, suing party, opposing party,
and resolution.
126 While many pre-2000 district dockets are available on PACER, other case documents are gener-
ally only available (via hyperlinks in the docket) from 2000 onward. Using PACER is also cost prohibi-
tive, with each page costing $0.08 to view.
127 Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on
Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. REs. Q. 623, 629-32 (2001).
128 Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial Common
Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007).
t29 See KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, COMMON SPACE DW-NOMINATE SCORES IST TO
Il0TH CONGRESSES (2009), http://voteview.com. (Click on NOMINATE Data, Roll Call Data, Soft-
ware, then click on Common Space DW-NOMINATE Scores Ist to ll0th Congresses).
130 Epstein et al., supra note 128, at 306.
'3' Id.
132 Id. at 307.




ideology of these actors using the median district court judge's JCS score
for the year that they assumed their position.135
b. Ideological distance.-For our models related to case out-
comes or terminations, we control for the possible constraining effect of the
ideologies of the district court judges' hierarchical superiors, the judges on
the circuit court of appeals. Specifically, we measure this effect as the dif-
ference between the ideology of the district court judge and that of the me-
dian judge on the circuit court immediately superior to that district judge."'
As with judge ideology, the ideology components of these distance scores
are based on the judges' JCS scores.137 Within our data, ideological dis-
tance ranges from -0.943 to 0.985, where a negative score represents a rela-
tively liberal district court judge serving within a relatively conservative
circuit and a positive score represents the opposite.
c. Judge sex and judge race.-In each of our models, we control
for the possible influence of the sex and race of the assigned judge. Re-
trieved from the Federal Judicial Center's Biographical Directory of Federal
Judges,"' each variable is dichotomous. Female judges and non-white
judges (Asian-American, African-American, and Hispanic) are both coded
as 1. Twenty-three percent of our cases have a female district court judge
and just under fourteen percent are assigned to a minority judge.
d. Entity structure.-To code entity structure for parties against
whom piercing is sought, we relied on the details provided by the parties in
their court documents. On occasion, these documents were ambiguous on
the structure of an entity. To supplement our coding, we relied on web-
based research and Dunn and Bradstreet's (D&B) Selectory Database."'
That database contains twenty-three million records, and contains informa-
tion about total sales, total employees, place of organization and (often) in-
corporation."o In the cases in our sample, approximately eighty-five
percent of the entities to be pierced are corporations, thirteen percent are
LLCs, and just over two percent are other forms.
135 Although a relatively novel and imprecise proxy, this measurement of magistrate ideology cap-
tures the political and legal process surrounding magistrate appointments in a way that mirrors JCS
scores for district court judges.
136 Similar measures have been used in the literature. See, e.g., Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note
90, at 15 n.22; Boyd & Spriggs, supra note 53, at 63-73.
137 See Epstein et al., supra note 128, at 306-09; Giles et al., supra note 127, at 629-32.
3 Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Sept.
22, 2010).
139 Temple Law School's Law Library generously purchased access to the product. For more in-
formation, see Selectory Business Database: Product Overview, http://www.selectoryonline.com (last
visited Sept. 22, 2010).
140 Selectory FAQs, http://www.selectoryonline.com/Selectory/ExternalPages/FAQs.aspx (last vi-
sited Sept. 22, 2010).
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As illustrated in Figure 3, corporations and LLCs exhibit relatively
similar patterns: both are owned largely by individual shareholders (seventy
percent for LLCs versus sixty-seven percent for corporations). Other enti-
ties, which for our purposes include foreign companies and a handful of
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Figure 3: The shareholder makeup of LLCs and corporations sought to be pierced
in our cases. This Figure drops other entities (including mostly foreign companies)
from the analysis. "Entity Mix" refers to groupings of individual and entity share-
holders or LLCs and corporations together as shareholders.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate that these entities are incorporated and orga-
nized in multiple states. The differences between Figures 4 and 5 likely re-
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Figures 4 (top) and 5 (bottom): States of incorporation and organi-
zation for corporations and LLCs to be pierced in our data. The
top, Figure 4, shows the percentage of corporations to be pierced
that are incorporated in a particular state. The bottom, Figure 5,
indicates the percentage of LLCs to be pierced that are organized in
a particular state. Both Figures omit states in our data with <1% of
total entities to be pierced.
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e. Veil piercing grounds.-In each case, coding for failure to
observe formalities, undercapitalization, and domination and control came
from the document that first explicated a rationale for piercing the corporate
veil. This document was nearly always a complaint.141 For each of these
three dichotomous variables, coding is equal to 1 if the piercing ground is
present.
f Defendants' size.-To measure the size of an entity, we de-
velop a variable based on the number of the entity's employees. Coded
from the D&B database and other sources, we collected information about
entity size for over eighty percent of the firms to be pierced in our data.142
Of those, fifty-five percent employed ten individuals or less. Twenty-six
percent had 11-50 employees; six percent had 51-100 employees; seven
percent had 501-1000 employees; and four percent had more than 1000
employees. Because of the high variance in these data, we measure defen-
dants' size by taking the log of the defendant's total number of employees.
g. Defendants' business lawyering.-As noted above, we also
consider the care with which the entity observed formal legal requirements.
Such formalities, like having a complete board book and holding regular
meetings, are quite difficult to observe without insider information about
the firms in question, something that is simply not systematically available.
We measure this variable by the presence of a distinction between place of
incorporation or organization and place of primary operation. As many
have observed, firms tend to reincorporate outside of their home state (typi-
cally Delaware) as they become larger, have access to more sophisticated
business lawyers, and can participate in the market for corporate control.'43
This measure thus functions as an admittedly imperfect proxy for the legal
formalities present in a firm and the sophistication of the business lawyers
to which the firm has access.
141 Rarely, the first mention of veil piercing was in a counterclaim. In such cases, for our purposes
we treated the counterclaim plaintiff as the plaintiff and the counterclaim defendant as the defendant.
142 For example, we also collect information about the number of employees from bankruptcy fil-
ings, corporate webpages, Frasers.com newspaper articles, and the complaints themselves. Most of the
missing companies are (1) entirely defunct and absent from the historical record, (2) bankrupt but with
insufficient information to recover financial and employee data, (3) foreign, or (4) subsidiaries of larger
companies in the data. To deal with these missing data, we utilize two techniques. In our primary ana-
lyses, we engage in the traditional, albeit less than satisfactory, practice of engaging in list-wise deletion
of missing values. See Gary King, James Honaker, Anne Joseph & Kenneth Scheve, Analyzing Incom-
plete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation, 95 AM. POL. SC. REV.
49, 49 (2001) (critiquing the list-wise deletion method of handling missing data). Doing this means that
all observations with missing values are dropped from the analyses. In our supplemental analyses, we
engage in what is known as multiple imputation, where the missing values are imputed into our data set
(along with corresponding statistical uncertainty), thus allowing us to analyze our complete set of data.
See id. at 53-56. As our regression results in the Appendix indicate, our results from both methods of
analysis are very similar.
143 See, e.g., Dammann & Schuindeln, Incorporation Choices, supra note 34, at 7-8.
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Our defendant business lawyering variable is coded as a dichotomous
variable, with a value of 1 indicating that an entity is incorporated or orga-
nized in a state different from the one in which it primarily operates. As il-
lustrated in Figure 6 below, we observe entities operating in many different
states. For each state below, we describe the degree to which we observe
entities incorporated or organized in a state different from the one in which
they were operating.
States of Incorporation & Operation
mmmmmemmuam
I I I I
0 20 40 60
Number of EntRies
80 100 120
Figure 6: Stacked bar chart of states of operation and incorpora-
tion/organization for the entities to be pierced in our data.
h. Causes of action.-To measure the effect of the type of credi-
tor in a veil piercing action, we develop variables for involuntary and vo-
luntary creditors. Seeking to expand this category beyond the ordinary raw
focus on contract and tort causes of action so that it matches better with the
theory,1" we define a plaintiff as making an "involuntary creditor" claim if
the plaintiff asserted a claim that generally arises out of an unexpected in-
jury. We include any cause of action under a regulatory schema, 45 intellec-
144 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 36, at 1880-81.
145 This includes product tampering in violation of a federal regulation, unauthorized practice, con-
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tual property,'46 consumer protection,'47 or common law tort.'48 We define a
"voluntary creditor" claim, by contrast, as one implying a pre-existing rela-
tionship between the parties: any real property,'49 fraud,5 0 employment,"'
equitable,152 agency,'53 fiduciary duty,'54 labor law,"' contract,"' misrepre-
sentation," or securities law claim."'
III. RESULTS
A. Content of Veil Piercing Complaint
As we have explained, we have certain expectations about the content
of veil piercing complaints, which arise mostly from our view that the con-
ventional wisdom will influence filing practice.
While tort and contract claims receive the greatest attention in the veil
piercing literature, they are certainly not the only causes of action that sig-
nal veil piercing activity. Indeed, as Figure 7 indicates, a variety of other
causes of action are well represented in our dataset's complaints. For ex-
ample, fraud, labor law, and equitable claims like promissory estoppel oc-
cur just a little less frequently than contract and tort claims.'" Figure 8
146 This includes patent infringement, copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and dilution.
147 This includes unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, false advertising, consumer fraud,
and false designation of origin.
148 This includes product liability, failure to warn, tortuous interference, and defective design.
149 This includes abandonment, restrictive covenants, real estate settlements, liens, replevin, and
eviction.
150 This includes deceit, fraudulent conveyance, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement,
fraud, and misrepresentation.
'5 This includes the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (2006), and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006), as well as retaliation, wrongful discharge and
unpaid wages.
152 This includes unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, quasi-contract, promissory estoppel, equitable
liens, and equitable relief.
153 This includes agency, respondeat superior, and vicarious liability.
154 This includes direct or derivative fiduciary causes of action, trust claims, and fiduciary obliga-
tions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006).
155 This includes most ERISA claims, claims under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act (COBRA), Pub L. No. 99-272, tit. X, 100 Stat. 82, 222-27 (1986), National Labor Relations
Board actions, and breaches of collective bargaining agreements.
156 This includes breaches of contracts, express and implied warranties, indemnification, and credi-
tors' claims for nonpayment.
157 This includes intentional, negligent, and fraudulent misrepresentation.
1 This includes claims under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006), and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006).
159 To explain the puzzling number of ERISA cases, particularly from the Northern District of Illi-
nois, we spoke on background with a lawyer who works at a union-side labor firm in Chicago, which
monthly files "dozens" of ERISA suits in federal court in that district. He explained that a small number
of union-side firms routinely plead veil piercing in multi-employer bargained plans. Such cases involve
very small defendants who are not expected to appear in court, leading to default. The default enables
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displays the areas of intersection of these causes of action, where claims in-
volve both involuntary and voluntary creditors. As the figure indicates,
over thirty percent of our cases involve both types of creditors, while an ad-
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Figure 7: Dot plot of the causes of action present in the complaints in our data.
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the plaintiffs to serve a citation to discover assets and garnish wages of the individual owners. Our
source believed that defendants are overall more likely to settle once such garnish orders are issued.
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Figure 8: Bar chart of the incidence of voluntary and involuntary creditor
claims in the complaints in our data.
Next, we examine how plaintiffs shape the veil piercing factors they
bring in their complaints, depicted in Figure 9. As we predicted, complaints
advance causes of action that basically replicate the factors incident in pub-
lished opinions (Figure 2)."'o This is an interesting result. It suggests that
160 Consider the following table:
Ground Thompson Original Rank Thompson Revised Rank Complaint Rank
(Figure 1) (Figure 2) (Figure 9)
ALTER EGO 2 2 1
FRAUD Not present Not present 2
DOMINION 11 1 3
INFORMALITIES 9 5 4
LACK OF SEPARATION 7 4 5
UNDERCAPITALIZATION 8 6 6
INSTRUMENTALITY 1 7 7
FAQADE, SHELL, OR DUMMY 5 8 8
INTERTWINING 6 9 9
UNITY OF INTEREST Not present Not present 10
SHAM Not present Not present 11
OVERLAP BETWEEN
COMPANY & MANAGEMENT
MISREPRESENTATION 3 3 13
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the grounds asserted by plaintiffs at the beginning of the case survive to the
case's termination. Given how cheap and easy it is to assert a particular
ground, the similarity between complaints and opinions suggests in turn that
the veil piercing factors instantiate an underlying pattern of facts-they are
more than mere surplus words in a particular complaint. Notably, the fac-
tors' distribution appears to match with the recommendations of practical
publications like form complaint books and attests to the importance of
such practitioner materials."'
Incidence of Veil Piercing Grounds (Current Study)
Alter Ego1
Fraud
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Figure 9: The percentage of complaints in our data that contain a particular
veil piercing ground.
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AGENCY 4 10 14
CONDUIT Not present Not present 15
161 See supra note 28 for a discussion of the content of these form complaint books.
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B. Veil Piercing Activity and Success
We coded the results of over 550 veil piercing motions and 580 non-
veil piercing motions.162 Figure 10 illustrates our dataset's veil piercing mo-
tions and their disposition.
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Figure 10: The disposition of veil piercing motions. "SJ" refers to motions for
summary judgment, and "JoP" refers to motions for judgment on the plead-
ings. Trial motions include both jury trial verdict forms, pre-trial motions in
limine, and post-trial motions for new trial.
Overall, about half of all veil piercing motions result in interstitial suc-
cesses; about fifteen percent involve interstitial or terminal losses; ten per-
cent succeed on the merits (twenty percent if default judgments are
included); and the remainder were pending at the time of settlement. Look-
ing only at resolved motions, and excluding default judgments, we see a
story of disproportionate success: plaintiffs prevailed on approximately
eighty-five percent of all veil piercing motions in our dataset. Many cases
162 We coded non-veil piercing motions for control purposes, narrowing our scope to motions where
(1) there was no veil piercing issue presented in the motion or resolution; and (2) the motion was signifi-







had their veil piercing claims still "alive" at the time of settlement. When
these are added to the cases which achieved a default judgment or an actual
merits-based veil piercing, one way to think about the success rate is to note
that in nearly seventy-eight percent of litigations, plaintiffs ultimately rea-
lized some value from their veil piercing claims.
Non-veil piercing motions paint a less dramatic story. Figure 11 dis-
plays the three major motion types.
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Figure 11: Selected non-veil piercing motions and their success rates. A win
here means that the moving party prevailed; in the case of a motion to dismiss,
the moving party was always the defendant. "JoP" refers to motions for judg-
ment on the pleadings.
Plaintiffs were somewhat less likely to win non-veil piercing discovery
than veil piercing discovery (a sixty-eight percent success rate in the non-
veil piercing context versus seventy-three percent in resolved veil piercing
discovery motions). These plaintiffs were similarly less likely to be suc-
cessful at fighting off motions to dismiss (sixty percent plaintiff success rate
891
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versus eighty-eight percent) and summary judgment (sixty-two percent ver-
sus ninety percent) outside of the veil piercing context.16 1
We now turn to a more systematic examination of veil piercing suc-
cess, both in terms of interstitial motions and ultimate case outcomes.
1. Interstitial Veil Piercing Activity.-We first turn to a closer ex-
amination of motions relating to veil piercing. We use a logistic regression
model. Our dependent variable, the outcome of veil piercing motions, is
coded as 1 for motions that are successful from the stance of the party wish-
ing to pierce the corporate veil. From this perspective, we define success to
mean either the movant was granted affirmative motions (i.e., those asking
for veil piercing relief) or the opposition was denied passive motions (i.e.,
those asking for veil piercing relief to be denied or dismissed). Motions
that fail to obtain affirmative or passive veil piercing relief are coded as 0."
Unresolved motions are dropped from the analysis. We cluster our obser-
vations by case and compute robust standard errors to account for the lack
of observation independence between numerous veil piercing motions aris-
ing from the same underlying case.' 5
The results of this regression analysis are reported in the Appendix.'66
Overall, the model performs quite well, reducing error in prediction by
nearly twenty-two percent. As these results indicate, a number of our va-
riables reach statistical significance (at p 5 0.05 (two-tailed)), including
judge ideology, defendant firm size, voluntary creditor-based causes of ac-
tion, and the presence of shell, fagade, and undercapitalization grounds for
piercing in the complaint. We do not find statistical significance, however,
for our variables regarding entity choice, shareholder identity, defendants
with business lawyering, judge gender or race, or appellate court control.
Nor do we find an increased incidence of success when failure to observe
formalities, inadequate capitalization, and domination and control were
cited as veil piercing grounds against corporations compared to LLCs.'"
163 These quantities treat motions where the veil piercing claims were dismissed but the case pro-
ceeded as a plaintiff "victory" for purposes of comparison with non-veil piercing motions. They also
exclude pending motions, meaning that those motions must be subtracted out of the denominator shown
in the figures to calculate the percentages presented in the text.
164 For more details on our definition of interstitial veil piercing success, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 53-63.
165 By clustering in this way, we recognize that observations from the same underlying case are not
independent, and thus that the standard errors resulting from a model that does not account for this will
be inaccurate. By clustering, our models yield robust standard errors (a.k.a. Huber-White standard er-
rors), and thus are appropriate given the violation of independence. See J. ScOTr LONG & JEREMY
FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA 86 (2d ed.
2006).
166 As noted above, our Appendix also includes the regression results for our multiple imputation
modeling.
167 Because of the necessitated interactive relationship between these piercing grounds and the type
of entity, we estimate a separate model with these variables in it. The results from this model are avail-
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While a coefficient reported in a logistic regression provides evidence
of that variable's statistical significance and the direction of its influence,
the coefficient cannot be directly interpreted for its substantive effect on the
incidence of a dependent variable.' 5 To that end, we simulate the predicted
probability that a veil piercing motion will be successful based on the added
presence of our statistically significant variables. Thus, while the regres-
sion tables are available in the Appendix, our focus for the remainder of our
discussion will rest on the substantive effects of our statistically significant
variables of interest as reported through our predicted probabilities.
Figure 12 displays the predicted probability that a veil piercing motion
will be successful conditioned on the changing values of entity size. As ex-
pected, the size of the entity to be pierced has an important effect on the li-
kelihood of a veil piercing motion being successful. In particular, as an
entity grows in size (as measured by the number of its employees), it is far
less likely to have its veil pierced during interstitial case activity. For ex-
ample, the figure indicates that the probability of successfully asserting a
veil piercing motion against companies with less than 300 employees is
around 0.80. For companies with more than 2100 employees, that number
drops below 0.20. While the confidence intervals surrounding the estimates
on the right side of the figure are quite large (due to the relatively small
number of large firms in our data), the downward slope of the results is
consistent and the overall effect of entity size remains impressive.
able in the Appendix. It is worth noting that while the interaction of a corporation with undercapitaliza-
tion piercing grounds is statistically significant compared to LLCs interacted with undercapitalization
(the baseline), further investigation reveals that this effect is driven entirely by the undercapitalization
ground, not entity structure.
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Figure 12: Predicted probability that a veil piercing motion will be successful
conditioned on the changing value of the size of the entity to be pierced. Other
variables not directly modeled here are held at their respective mean and mod-
al values for purposes of the simulation.'69
We also find that judge ideology has a significant, but surprising, effect
on the likelihood of veil piercing motion success. The substantive effect of
this variable is plotted in Figure 13, which depicts judge ideology on the x-
axis (moving from most liberal on the left (-0.6) to most conservative on the
right (0.7)) and the predicted probability of a veil piercing motion being
granted on the y-axis. Figure 13 shows that as a judge's ideology moves in
a conservative direction, the mean likelihood of interstitial success increas-
es. Motions in cases with very liberal judges have a mean predicted proba-
bility of being successful of under 0.5, while that probability is around 0.75
for moderate district court judges and near 0.95 for conservative district
court judges.'o
169 Predicted probabilities were computed using SPost and Clarify in Stata. See LONG & FREESE,
supra note 165, at 75; Gary King, Michael Tomz & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical
Analysis: Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. Sci. 347, 351-53 (2000).
170 The large confidence interval on the left side of the figure is likely due to the large variation in
veil piercing motion outcomes in cases with liberal judges. As the presiding judge becomes more con-
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Figure 13: Predicted probability that a veil piercing motion will be successful
conditioned on the changing value of the ideology of the case's presiding dis-
trict court judge. Other variables not directly modeled here are held at their re-
spective mean and modal values for purposes of the simulation.
We turn next to the results plotted in Figure 14."' The top portion of
the figure plots the effect of adding a voluntary creditor to a veil piercing
complaint.'72 On average, a veil piercing motion in a case in which the
plaintiff asserted a claim as a voluntary creditor is over seventeen percent
more likely to be successful than in a case without a voluntary creditor.
The confidence interval plotted around that mean prediction does not inter-
sect with 0, indicating that this effect is indeed distinguishable from 0.
servative, that variability disappears from our data, and, as a result, we can speak about the predicted
judicial behavior with a great deal more confidence.
171 The value of interest, the difference in the predicted probabilities, has a separate distribution
from the individually computed predicted probabilities, with its own mean and confidence interval. See
Peter C. Austin & Janet E. Hux, A Brief Note on Overlapping Confidence Intervals, 36 J. VASCULAR
SURGERY 194, 194 (2002); Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1811, 1815 (2007). Here,
the interval for the value of interest is depicted in the figure. Because this interval does not contain 0,
we can say that, statistically speaking, the predicted probabilities for the four variables plotted in Figure
16 are different from one another.
172 The variable for involuntary creditors does not reach statistical significance.
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Figure 14: Change in the predicted probability that a veil piercing motion will
be successful based on a voluntary creditor, shell, facade, or undercapitaliza-
tion piercing ground being present. Solid dots in the figure represent the mean
change in the predicted probability while the black line around that dot
represents the 95% confidence interval on the difference. Other variables not
directly modeled here are held at their respective mean and modal values for
purposes of the simulation.
The bottom portion of Figure 14 contains the plots for the substantive
effect of the three veil piercing grounds that have a statistically significant
effect on veil piercing motion success: shell, fagade, and failure to ade-
quately capitalize (or undercapitalization). As can be seen, the addition of
fagade and shell grounds to a veil piercing complaint each provide strong
negative effects on the likelihood of successful veil piercing motions in that
case. A shell ground decreases the likelihood of veil piercing motion suc-
cess by over thirty-nine percent, on average, and a fagade ground does the
same by nearly fifty-three percent, on average. Stating undercapitalization
grounds has the opposite effect, albeit more modestly. The addition of an
undercapitalization ground to a veil piercing complaint makes an interstitial
veil piercing motion fourteen percent more likely to be successful.
To provide an even more intricate test of the potential effect that the
type of entity structure to be pierced and the identity of the shareholder
ownership have on veil piercing motion success, we developed a series of
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variables representing each possible combination of entity-shareholder rela-
tionship. The results for the regression with these variables are reported in
Model 2 in the veil piercing motion table in the Appendix. While many of
these variables are not statistically or substantively different from one
another, we do find that corporations owned by artificial shareholders are
more likely to be subject to successful veil piercing motions than LLCs
owned by artificial shareholders.
2. Outcome-Based Veil Piercing.-For our final inquiry, we examine
the likelihood of case-level veil piercing success. As with interstitial veil
piercing activity, we expect that our above hypotheses will be important de-
terminants of outcome success. For our purposes, veil piercing is consi-
dered a success at the case level under two sets of conditions: (1) when the
veil has been affirmatively pierced through veil piercing motion activity and
(2) when, after veil piercing has been litigated on the record (through mo-
tion activity), the case settles while veil piercing is still "alive" in the case
(i.e., having never been dismissed or denied). Given the limited informa-
tion that exists for the terms of settled cases, we believe this definition
strikes a good balance by capturing as veil piercing successes only a con-
servative set of settlements where veil piercing was likely on the negotia-
tion table. The Appendix includes an alternative set of results based on the
coding of veil piercing success both more narrowly (excluding all settle-
ments) and more broadly (including all settlements where veil piercing is
still "alive," regardless of the affirmative presence of veil piercing motions
in the case) to help mollify concerns that our coding mechanism is driving
our results.
Whether a case ends with a veil piercing is our dependent variable, a
dichotomous one that is coded as 1 if there is veil piercing success. As in
our interstitial veil piercing inquiry, we model the effects of our covariates
of interest on success using logistic regression with robust standard errors
clustered on individual cases. The regression results for this model, which
provide a modest two percent reduction in prediction error, are reported in
the Appendix.
The veil piercing outcome model provides some support for our hypo-
theses."' Entity size, defendants with business lawyering, and undercapita-
lization all reach statistical significance and behave in the expected
direction. As we discuss in more detail below, ideological effects, both
from the district court judge and the supervising circuit court, have statistic-
al power, but indicate an ideological effect that is opposite from what has
been found in previous veil piercing work.
173 As with our veil piercing motions inquiry, we do not find support here for our conditional hypo-
thesis about entity-type veil piercing grounds. The statistically significant effect reported in the Appen-
dix regression table for this model (the relationship of corporation-undercapitalization to LLC-
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Figure 15 depicts the predicted probability that a case will have ulti-
mate veil piercing success based on the size of the entity to be pierced. Just
like in the veil piercing motion context, this probability decreases as the
entity to be pierced increases in size. Very small firms have a probability of
being pierced of around 0.20; that number quickly approaches 0 as firm size
increases.
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Figure 15: Predicted probability that a veil piercing case will be successful
conditioned on the changing value of the size of the firm to be pierced. Other
variables not directly modeled here are held at their respective mean and mod-
al values for purposes of the simulation.
Ideological considerations also appear to be operating at the case out-
come level. Our variable measuring the ideological constraint of the circuit
court on a district court judge (measured as the ideological distance be-
tween a district court judge and the median judge in his circuit) is statisti-
cally significant (at p 5 0.05 (two-tailed)), and our district court judge
ideology variable is marginally significant (p = 0.077). The substantive ef-
fect of each of these is worth additional discussion.
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As Figure 16 clarifies, the more conservative a district court judge is,
the more likely the case before him will have case-level veil piercing suc-
cess. This result, of course, mirrors that in the veil piercing motion context.
While the most liberal judge's case has around a 0.15 probability of having
ultimate veil piercing success, the most conservative judge's case has
around a 0.30 probability.
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Figure 16: Predicted probability that a veil piercing case will be successful
conditioned on the changing value of the ideology of the case's presiding dis-
trict court judge. Other variables not directly modeled here are held at their re-
spective mean and modal values for purposes of the simulation.
Our findings with regard to the ideological constraint of the governing
circuit court are consistent with our district court judge ideology findings.
As Figure 17 indicates, when a liberal district court judge serves within a
conservative circuit (left side of Figure 17), he is more likely to have his
cases end with veil piercing success. Conversely, a conservative judge
serving in a liberal circuit is less likely to have his cases end with veil pierc-
ing success (right side of Figure 17). These findings, while certainly need-
ing further examination in future projects, seem to confirm that circuit court
preferences (with conservatives favoring more veil piercings than liberals)
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Figure 17: Predicted probability that a veil piercing case will be successful
conditioned on the changing value of the difference in ideology between a
case's presiding district court judge and the circuit court's median judge ideol-
ogy. Other variables not directly modeled here are held at their respective
mean and modal values for purposes of the simulation.
Figure 18 depicts the substantive effect for the two other variables of
interest that reach statistical significance. First, the top half of the figure
shows the change in the predicted probability that a case will have veil-
piercing success based on the presence of business lawyering. As expected,
the presence of such lawyering decreases (by about ten percent) the likelih-
ood that the firm's veil will be pierced. Finally, the inclusion of undercapi-
talization as a ground for piercing the corporate veil has an average positive
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Figure 18: Change in the predicted probability that a veil piercing case will be
successful based on business lawyering and the assertion of an undercapitaliza-
tion piercing ground in the complaint. Solid dots in the figure represent the
mean change in the predicted probability while the black line around that dot
represents the 95% confidence interval on the difference. Other variables not
directly modeled here are held at their respective mean and modal values for
purposes of the simulation.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
We begin this section by identifying the primary, sometimes implicit,
assumptions in veil piercing scholarship.
Both qualitative and quantitative piercing scholars assume that there is
no methodological problem in aggregating appellate and trial court opi-
nions. Jurists conclude that while trial court opinions may be legally subor-
dinate to appellate opinions, they reflect the same general judicial behavior
with respect to veil piercing claims.174 This approach is mistaken in practice
and in theory. It implicitly assumes-wrongly-that trial opinions are as
174 See Hodge & Sachs, supra note 24, at 349 (discussing selection when explaining that their data-
set included both trial and appellate opinions, including ones that might arise in the same case, but not-
ing that "these limitations are the same as those faced by Professor Thompson"); Swain & Aguilar,
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likely to end up in electronic databases as are appellate opinions'" and dis-
counts the likelihood that trial judges will dispose of many hard, substantive
problems with summary orders."' Thus, even if trial and appellate judges
behaved the same way, their opinions might look different. And our find-
ings about trial court behavior-particularly with respect to judicial ideolo-
gy, veil piercing factors, causes of action, and defendant entity size-
suggest that district court litigation of veil piercing cases produces out-
comes through processes which are quite different from those that result in
appellate opinions.
Second, limited liability scholarship has focused on the difference be-
tween involuntary and voluntary creditors of the entity.' As previous work
has found, even in judicial opinions, a large percentage of claims appear to
have arisen outside of the common law context."' More importantly, since
plaintiffs can bring multiple causes of action in one complaint, a judge's fo-
cus in an opinion on one particular kind of liability does not exclude the
possibility that a plaintiffs claim originated in multiple ways. Indeed, we
found that over thirty percent of our cases asserted both voluntary and invo-
luntary creditor claims and nearly nineteen percent contained claims sound-
ing in both tort and contract law."' This messy reality is obscured when
scholars look at opinions, which usually arise when a case has already been
winnowed beyond recognition from its original form.
Finally, scholars have tried to identify factors, or clusters of factors,
mentioned in opinions that may correlate with piercing. The implicit goal
here seems to be to determine which item in the "laundry list" of reasons
expressed by judges as part of veil piercing doctrine really matters-is it in-
formalities? Dominion? Fraud? Such correlations, whether anecdotal or
modeled, assume that judicial reasons are strongly related to the underlying
facts of the case, and that judges find such facts neutrally. But using the
reasons courts give in published opinions to infer the causes of their deci-
sions is at best a dubious undertaking. It assumes, wrongly in our view, that
a more satisfying and complete theory would persuade or compel judges to
render predictable veil piercing decisions.'
See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1133, 1141
(1990) (finding that twenty percent of cases result in a reported opinion); Karen Swenson, Federal Dis-
trict Court Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25 JUST. Sys. J. 121, 122 (2004) (revealing that district
judges release fewer than twenty percent of their written opinions).
176 See Hoffman et al., supra note 17, at 715.
177 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 13, at 635 (proposing different veil piercing approaches depend-
ing on the extent of the creditor's initial opportunity for bargaining and private risk allocation).
178 Over twenty-five percent of the cases in our dataset do not involve common law causes of ac-
tion.
In future work, we plan to utilize network theory to analyze the ways that causes of actions are
grouped in complaints.
180 See Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, supra note 14, at 97-99.
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Our approach challenges these foundational assumptions and provides
a distinctive and hopefully reorienting account of veil piercing disputes.
We find that a mixed set of legal and extra-legal factors influence the litiga-
tion of veil piercing claims. Generally speaking, legal factors-like the de-
fendant's legal structure and location of incorporation-play a less
important role, while extra-legal factors-like the defendant's size-play a
more important role than previously has been observed. This does not
mean that legal formalities are practically insignificant.I Rather, the selec-
tion of cases obscures the observable effect of "the formal structure of the
law."'82 This is true whether litigation is analyzed by the traditional method
of reading opinions, the newer method of counting opinions, or an intensive
study of docket content.183 Selection makes hay of inference, whether intui-
tive or statistical.
Despite selection, veil piercing grounds asserted in complaints are sig-
nificant in models of litigation success. Undercapitalization allegations are
associated with a strongly increased chance of winning both veil piercing
motions and cases. This result fits well with normative scholarship defend-
ing this factor as central to veil piercing doctrine.'84 Similarly, the negative
relationship of fagade and shell grounds with veil piercing success is readily
understandable: these factors are conclusory allegations that are likely asso-
ciated with a weak underlying case for disregarding the corporate form.'
What is important to note here is that the drafting of complaints does not
necessarily cause success. Rather, complaints reflect the underlying
strength of the factual record. Lawyers who can allege undercapitalization
do so because they believe that undercapitalization is a factor that courts
consider important in deciding whether to respect the veil. But plaintiffs
with weaker sets of facts may attempt a different strategy: the kitchen-
sink.'86
This relationship also implies that the particular grounds for relief as-
serted in complaints generally reflect the underlying facts of the case. This
181 For example, it is possible that plaintiffs suing LLCs are less likely to assert veil piercing claims
than plaintiffs suing similarly situated corporations. The LLCs remaining in our dataset would then be,
for whatever reason, the most vulnerable entities to veil piercing claims-plaintiffs, sensing weakness,
sued them. Similarly, highly formalized small firms may be less likely to be sued than less formalized
small firms.
182 Priest & Klein, supra note 57, at 6.
183 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
184 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 8, at 1336-39 (noting and criticizing the importance of undercapita-
lization allegations). But see Thompson, supra note 1, at 1064-67 (finding that undercapitalization was
not a successful factor).
185 Of course, either independently or because of the underlying merits, courts may also see these
grounds as conclusory and give them little weight. Our data-like all observational data--cannot easily
distinguish between weak underlying facts and weak legal claims.
186 We do find several surprises with respect to veil piercing grounds. In particular, we do not find
that allegations of informalities, alter ego, fraud, or dominion and control influence litigation success,
though those factors are perceived to be important in scholarship.
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result will surprise some because notice pleading rules, together with the
expectation that plaintiffs will learn and shape their cases through discov-
ery, might lead scholars to expect that the framing of the complaint func-
tions as mere rhetorical gloss, insignificant in its particulars. We find, by
contrast, that plaintiffs' complaints and the opinions that result focus on
very similar factors. This, in turn, suggests that complaints themselves are
objects worthy of quantitative study beyond the confines of this particular
project.
Confirming previous empirical scholarship, we find that voluntary
creditors are strong veil piercing plaintiffs: a plaintiff asserting a cause of
action associated with being a voluntary creditor is seventeen percent more
likely to win its veil piercing motions than a plaintiff which does not assert
a voluntary creditor cause of action. This effect is admittedly modest be-
cause: (1) it is not bilateral, as plaintiffs asserting involuntary creditor
claims are not more likely to lose motions; (2) it does not extend to case-
level success; and (3) causes of action overlap broadly. Nevertheless, the
surprising persistence of the successful voluntary creditor effect in veil
piercing scholarship suggests that theory simply does not reflect how courts
actually think about such plaintiffs. Our best explanation, reading over the
dockets and considering them impressionistically, is that voluntary creditors
simply have stronger cases than involuntary ones. Their complaints allege
more tangible and easily provable harms, and the damages at issue are larg-
er and less illusory. This reality swamps any sympathy due the unsuspect-
ing involuntary creditor.
With respect to a third legal factor, defendants' legal structure and so-
phistication in lawyering, we find that in very limited circumstances, as
predicted, LLCs were less likely to be pierced than corporations where we
compared the piercing likelihood of both kinds of entities when owned by
artificial shareholders. However, we found no evidence that individual
shareholders were more likely to be subject to piercing liability than corpo-
rate ones. We did observe that more heterogeneous entities-those operat-
ing and incorporated in different states-were more likely to preserve their
limited liability at the case level, even holding extraneous factors like firm
size constant. To a degree, legal complexity and heterogeneous legal opera-
tion-attorneys' contributions to the firm--do insulate against veil piercing,
but the effect is subtle.
Extra-legal factors play a more extensive role, or at least leave a more
tangible residue in the data. The number of employees in a firm strongly
predicts interstitial and case-level veil piercing outcomes: this factor moves
the predicted probability of an interstitial motion success from about eighty
percent for very small firms to effectively zero for firms with several thou-
sand employees. This finding supports our hypothesis that courts think of
veil piercing in terms of rough justice: small firms simply do not seem wor-
thy of privileging their owners with immunity from damages. This result
holds even when we control for legal factors-formalities, incorporation,
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sophistication-that might be expected to make it disappear. Thus, our re-
search implies that the best way to defend prospectively against veil pierc-
ing claims is to hire more employees.
This descriptive finding poses a normative problem. What corporate
law policy rationale could explain the shifting of the risk of liability from
small firm creditors to the entity, where larger firms do not experience this
same effect, and where we control for legal factors like formalities and in-
corporation choice? This effect looks much like a previously unknown tax
on small firm development. Given that many commentators have urged
that limited liability be seen as a stimulus to entrepreneurship, our data re-
flect that courts are, perhaps unconsciously, putting their thumb on the other
side of the scale.
This entity size effect suggests a need for more research on the motiva-
tion of entrepreneurs to incorporate. Scholars have often asserted that in-
corporation is necessary to motivate individuals to engage in early-stage
business activities.' However, to the extent the liability shield does not
become hardy until an entity has grown to a more stable size, we question
whether this assumption reflects reality. The question then becomes: why
do entrepreneurs incorporate such micro-firms?
On the one hand, perhaps individual entrepreneurs and their lawyers
(mistakenly) believe that an impermeable liability shield will accrue imme-
diately upon filing a charter or signing an organizing document. This
would imply that the market for information about legal rules is somewhat
inefficient. Lawyers may advise clients that limited liability is determined
and strengthened solely by changes in the kinds of paper-based legal engi-
neering at which lawyers themselves excel: maintaining separate bank ac-
counts, holding meetings of the board, and issuing stock certificates. That
potentially mistaken view of the world follows from a reliance on opinions,
which have the advantage of being cheap to consume, and which play to
lawyers' training and expertise. This explanation would provide yet anoth-
er argument against rules that limit entry into the legal market.'
Another possibility is that individual entrepreneurs do not believe that
limited liability will become effective immediately but incorporate anyway.
For example, incorporation might be motivated by an attempt to access the
187 See, e.g., Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, supra note 14, at 495 ("[T]here is a widely
shared view that limited liability was, and remains, essential to attracting the enormous amount of in-
vestment capital necessary for industrial corporations to arise and flourish."); Stephen B. Presser,
Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L.
REV. 148, 164 (1992) ("If it is true that the original justification for limited liability was that it encou-
rages investment in the small firm, or investment by entrepreneurs of modest means, and if we are still
interested in encouraging individual entrepreneurship through incorporation, this ought to be, perhaps,
the most crucial aspect to be considered in veil-piercing doctrine.").
1s This is perhaps because of a distortion in the market for legal services. See generally Gillian K.
Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Cor-
porate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008).
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credit markets, where investors may be unwilling to make loans to individ-
uals who do not exhibit the seriousness of purpose that incorporation sig-
nals.'" Alternatively, of course, entrepreneurs may incorporate to channel
the behavior of co-owners with respect to exit and control.'90 Or, in certain
sectors of the economy, they may wish to motivate employees with stock
option grants.' 9' We cannot distinguish between these possibilities. Indeed,
we do not directly measure entity age, so our results offer an imprecise
guide to whether a newly incorporated firm would be more likely to be
pierced. Nevertheless, the data suggest that existing work has been too
quick to assume that incorporation is necessarily motivated by limited lia-
bility.' We encourage scholars to focus more clearly on this question.' 93
Judge ideology also plays a significant role, but in an unexpected di-
rection. Contrary to previous scholarship'94 and our expectations, liberal
judges are less, not more, likely to be sympathetic to veil piercing plaintiffs.
The size of this effect and its confirmation by the appellate judge control
factors is puzzling. Further work on the influence of ideology in district
189 Ronald Mann's work offers limited support for this hypothesis. Mann, surveying lenders to
small businesses, found that there was no relationship between incorporation and the use of secured
debt. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 1, 42-43
(1997). This, he argues, means that individuals receiving unsecured loans are not incorporating to avoid
personal liability: the "opportunity to become judgment-proof is irrelevant to the decisions of borrow-
ers." Id. at 42. Mann further reports that lenders uniformly demand (and receive) personal guarantees
from debtors, which helps to explain the relative disuse of secured credit. Id. at 23 (reporting qualitative
evidence). Another reason that individuals might need to incorporate to access capital may be the ability
for lenders to avoid usury laws. See Comm'r v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340, 342 (1988).
190 See Robert C. Illig, Minority Investor Protections as Default Norms: Using Price to Illuminate
the Deal in Close Corporations, 56 Am. U. L. REV. 275, 312 (2006) (pointing out that investors may
chose the corporate form in order to "make exit more difficult").
We thank Darian Ibrahim for suggesting this possibility.
192 Cf How Some Firms in India Succeed by Bypassing Entrenched Financial and Legal Systems,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Nov. 1, 2006, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid
=1596 (noting some Indian entrepreneurs expect their personal assets to be protected by ex post negotia-
tions with their lenders, not limited liability).
19 There is an emerging literature on the motivations of domestic entrepreneurs, but none (that we
know of) regarding expectations about liability. Work on entrepreneurs' knowledge of the law suggests
a low degree of sophistication. See Hayden R. Brainard, Survey and Study of Technology Development
and Transfer Needs in New York, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 423, 432 (1999) (pointing out entrepreneurs'
ignorance of intellectual property issues). There is also a set of data on entrepreneur overconfidence.
See Arnold C. Cooper, Carolyn Y. Woo & William C. Dunkelberg, Entrepreneurs'Perceived Chances
for Success, 3 J. BUS. VENTURING 97, 103 (1988) (describing entrepreneurs' optimistic perceptions of
the likelihood of their own success). Finally, there is a large and growing set of data on entrepreneurial
behavior more generally. See HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
SURVEY AND INTRODUCTION (Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch eds., 2003); Aymo Brunetti, Gregory
Kisunko & Beatrice Weder, Institutional Obstacles for Doing Business: Data Description and Metho-
dology of a Worldwide Private Sector Survey (1997), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/extemal/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469
3 8 2&piPK=6 4 16 5
421&menuPK=64166322&entitylD=-000009265_3971110141322 (examining entrepreneurs' attitudes
in light of unpredictable lawmaking).
194 See Sunstein et al., supra note 78, at 304.
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court decisionmaking in commercial cases is necessary. However, we
might speculate that conservative judges are more likely to be interested in,
and thus pay attention to, the interstices of veil piercing cases than liberal
judges. This attention may make these judges more likely to see merit in
plaintiffs' claims. An attention-based hypothesis would explain why the
ideology effect is so much stronger in the motions-level data than the case-
level data. It would not explain why even at the case level, plaintiffs are
more likely to be successful when litigating before conservative judges. As
we have suggested, further research is necessary."'
CONCLUSION
The role that extra-legal influences play in veil piercing cases should
caution corporate lawyers and scholars. Although scholars have focused on
the influence of law and lawyers' craft on the likelihood of defending the
veil, we find that two previously ignored factors-ideology and firm size-
play as important a role, if not a more significant one. This finding reminds
us that legal rules do not fully constrain judges, even those in the trial
courts. We hope that it sparks further work on the motivation of judges in
commercial cases-to ask how ideology influences their decisions. Is the
effect conscious? Or is it the result of culturally mediated differences in
perception of fact? That question remains for further study. Similarly left
on the table are questions about why entrepreneurs incorporate, and how
they think limited liability works.
We leave these motivational questions unanswered for the same reason
that we generally have ignored questions about what trial judges believe.
Our purpose here was simply to describe how veil piercing disputes in fed-
eral court are resolved. Unlike previous research, our findings do not nec-
essarily unsettle existing theory about how judges think about limited
liability. Our focus is on what judges actually do. We confirm that limited
liability disputes are subject to an expected selection pressure, although
models of interstitial litigation events are more resistant to selection than
models that focus only on case-level dispositions.'9 6 Overall, the grounds
asserted in veil piercing complaints signal the strength of the underlying
case. While entity size and sophistication matter in ways that theory would
predict, creditor type and ideology provide surprising results.
We contest the conventional wisdom not just in its specifics but in its
general theme that veil piercing doctrine is especially random and "frea-
195 We do not find evidence for the judicial demographic hypothesis: neither women nor minority
judges advance veil piercing cases in a statistically distinguishable way from white men. We do find
such effects with respect to non-veil piercing motions and settlement and will be exploring those find-
ings in future work.
196 As explained above, and as detailed in the Appendix, a model of motions success reduced error
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kish.""7 We think that the patterns we have observed fit well with a set of
cases influenced by selection. Plaintiffs do win far more often during litiga-
tion than popular accounts of the doctrine's rare nature would have led us to
expect, but their ultimate chance of obtaining relief on the merits is ob-
scured by settlement, which disposes of two out of every three veil piercing
cases filed in federal court. Because of settlement and selection, observa-
tional data simply cannot definitively resolve how a judge will think about a
novel veil piercing case.
Litigation results can tell us nothing more, and nothing less, than the
kinds of factors which mattered in previously decided cases. Here, two ex-
tra-legal factors appear to be both important and surprising: judge ideology
and firm size. Meanwhile, formalities, plaintiffs' tactics, and defendants'
legal planning have modest relationships to observed outcomes. To owners
of the smallest of businesses, the message coming from this data is unfortu-
nately both clear and unsatisfying: neither reliance on legal formalities nor
pat expectations about the pro-business orientation of conservative judges
will protect a firm from having to defend its veil in court. Our message to
scholars is similarly unsettling: to predict how judges will react to veil
piercing allegations and to understand their motivations, observation must
yield to experiment.




Veil Piercing Motion Logistic Regression Models
MODEL (1) MODEL (2) MODEL (3) MODEL (4)
Complex Entity/VP Imputation (Main
Main Model Etity/Shareholder Grounds Model)
Variables Interaction
Judge Ideology 2.526* 2.637* 2.444* 1.511
(1.18) (1.18) (1.02) (1.09)
Appellate Court
C to t -0.844 -1.032 -1.129 -0.328
Control
(0.97) (1.00) (0.82) (0.92)
Female Judge 0.258 0.220 0.121 0.112
(0.52) (0.51) (0.51) (0.43)
Minority Judge 0.365 0.154 0.453 -0.075
(0.58) (0.58) (0.56) (0.52)
Entity Size -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Business Lawyering 0.057 0.164 0.485 -0.129
(0.76) (0.75) (0.65) (0.67)
Other Entity Type 0.597 - - -0.192
(0.90) - - (0.93)
LLC -0.447 - - -0.358
(0.58) - - (0.54)
Pierced Party Any
Entity, Shareholder Any -0.200 - - -0.037
Natural Person
(0.47) - - (0.41)
No Veil Piercing Cause -0.584 -0.663 -0.496 -0.383
of Action
(0.57) (0.57) (0.50) (0.50)
Voluntary
Creditory C0.928* 0.595 0.644 0.563
Creditor Claim
(0.44) (0.48) (0.40) (0.44)
Involuntary -0.110 -0.022 0.189 -0.146
Creditor Claim
(0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.35)
Overlap -0.900 -1.174* - -0.976
(0.60) (0.60) - (0.53)
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Unity 0.895 0.725 - 0.694
(1.17) (1.12) - (0.85)
Shell -1.887* -1.889* - -1.694*
(0.63) (0.63) - (0.56)
Fraud -0.562 -0.621 - -0.851*
(0.38) (0.39) - (0.35)
Sham 1.500 1.433 - 1.147
(0.99) (0.92) - (0.93)
Facade -2.736* -2.654* - -2.413*
(1.07) (1.08) - (0.67)
Dominion 0.608 0.830 - 0.573
(0.46) (0.47) - (0.42)
Formalities -0.120 -0.132 - 0.226
(0.56) (0.51) - (0.50)
Undercapitalization 1.693* 1.467* - 1.223*
(0.48) (0.50) - (0.43)
Intertwine -0.238 -0.252 - -0.070
(0.58) (0.62) - (0.53)
Separation -0.134 -0.249 - -0.412
(0.52) (0.47) - (0.43)
Alter Ego 0.171 0.207 - 0.089
(0.53) (0.51) - (0.48)
Instrumentalities 0.833 0.876 - 0.612
(0.56) (0.58) - (0.48)
Discovery Motion -0.375 -0.365 -0.050 -0.856
(0.48) (0.51) (0.47) (0.59)
Fact Motion -0.142 -0.095 0.041 -0.452
(0.51) (0.52) (0.43) (0.61)
Diversity
ursictin 0.267 0.118 0.177 0.341
Jurisdiction
(0.42) (0.43) (0.38) (0.41)
Removed Case -0.237 -0.130 -0.198 -0.492
(0.65) (0.68) (0.62) (0.56)









Pierced Party Any Cor-
poration, Shareholder - 1.489*
Entity Mix
- (0.72)
Pierced Party Any Cor-
poration, Shareholder - 0.460
Any Natural Person
- (0.48)
Pierced Party Any LLC, - -0.039
Shareholder Any LLC
- (0.84)
Pierced Party Any LLC,
Shareholder Any Natu- - -0.168
ral Person
- (0.65)
Interaction of LLC and
- - 1.628 -
Formalities
(1.45) -
Interaction of LLC and - -0.444
Dominion
- - (0.73) -
Interaction of
Corporation and For- - - -0.755 -
malities
- - (0.44) -
Interaction of Corpora-
tion and - - 1.254* -
Undercapitalization
- - (0.50) -
Interaction of Corp- - - 0.500
oration and Dominion
- - (0.47)
Constant 1.164 0.936 0.723 1.885*
(0.96) (0.90) (0.87) (0.96)
Log Likelihood -130.64477 -128.717 142.15425 -
Pseudo R2 81.26 0.222 0.1404 -
Observations 325 325 325 385
Percent Reduction in
Peror (Redut 21.92% 25.96% 24.60% 10.23%
Error (PRE)
* p 5 0.05 (two-tailed)
Robust standard errors listed in parentheses
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Veil Piercing Case Logistic Regression Models
MODEL (1) MODEL (2) MODEL (3) MODEL (4) MODEL (5) MODEL (6)
Main Model DV includes DV includes Main DV, Main DV, Main DV,
all settlements no settlements Complex Entity/VP Imputation
where veil Entity/ Grounds
piercing is Shareholder Interaction
still alive Variables
Judge 0.906 0.906 -0.867 0.905 0.889 0.713
Ideology
(0.51) (0.51) (1.03) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Appellate -0.907* -0.907* 0.815 -0.898* -0.875* -0.719
Court Control
(0.47) (0.47) (0.85) (0.47) (0.45) (0.45)
Female Judge 0.007 0.007 -0.174 -0.045 -0.014 0.021
(0.23) (0.23) (0.49) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Minority 0.187 0.187 0.259 0.228 0.232 0.178
Judge
(0.27) (0.27) (0.52) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26)
Entity Size -0.001* -0.001* -0.002 -0.001* -0.001 0.000
_______ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Business La-
-0.785* -0.785* -0.485 -0.621 -0.621* -0.875*
wyenng
(0.32) (0.32) (0.78) (0.33) (0.31) (0.32)
Other Entity 1.198 1.198 1.033 - - 1.026
Type
(0.70) (0.70) (1.40) - - (0.71)
LLC -0.218 -0.218 0.118 - - -0.206
(0.31) (0.31) (0.66) - - (0.30)
Pierced Party
AnyEntity, -0.386 -0.386 1.183 - - -0.233
Shareholder
Any Person
(0.22) (0.22) (0.62) - - (0.22)
No Veil
Piercing -0.426 -0.426 -0.860* -0.431 -0.473* -0.398
Cause of
Action




Creditor -0.199 -0.199 -0.742 -0.191 -0.226 -0.185
Claim
(0.24) (0.24) (0.47) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23)
Involuntary
Creditor -0.026 -0.026 -0.287 0.005 -0.004 -0.054
Claim
(0.21) (0.21) (0.47) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
Overlap 0.072 0.072 0.030 0.030 - 0.095
(0.37) (0.37) (0.79) (0.37) - (0.36)
Unity -0.330 -0.330 -1.511 -0.414 - -0.396
(0.35) (0.35) (1.05) (0.35) - (0.34)
Shell 0.376 0.376 -0.489 0.461 - 0.395
(0.41) (0.41) (0.78) (0.40) - (0.38)
Fraud 0.280 0.280 0.249 0.235 - 0.267
(0.22) (0.22) (0.46) (0.22) - (0.22)
Sham 0.105 0.105 0.448 0.278 - 0.124
(0.42) (0.42) (0.67) (0.41) - (0.39)
Facade -0.667 -0.667 -0.090 -0.931 - -0.939
(0.51) (0.51) (1.00) (0.57) - (0.49)
Dominion 0.102 0.102 -0.201 0.116 - 0.035
(0.22) (0.22) (0.47) (0.22) - (0.21)
Formalities 0.068 0.068 -0.295 0.124 - 0.072
(0.24) (0.24) (0.43) (0.25) - (0.24)
Undercapita- 0.505* 0.505* 0.568 0.560* - 0.477
lization
(0.26) (0.26) (0.48) (0.25) - (0.25)
Intertwine 0.144 0.144 -0.011 0.115 - 0.097
(0.31) (0.31) (0.58) (0.31) - (0.30)
Separation -0.481* -0.481* -0.144 -0.490* - -0.351
(0.25) (0.25) (0.52) (0.25) - (0.24)
Alter Ego 0.007 0.007 0.353 -0.029 - 0.097
(0.21) (0.21) (0.40) (0.21) - (0.20)
Instrumentali-
0.176 0.176 0.747 0.093 - 0.190
ties
(0.31) (0.31) (0.60) (0.32) (0.31)
Diversity -0.004 -0.004 0.602 -0.043 -0.006 -0.052
Jurisdiction
(0.21) (0.21) (0.46) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
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Removed
0.170 0.170 -1.310 0.169 0.180 0.001
Case



















Any Corpora- - - -0.25 1-
tion, Share-
holder Person
- - - ___(0.26) -
Pierced Party
Any LLC, - - - -0.380 -
Person
____ _ -_ - (0.37) - _
Interaction of
LLC with - -0.105
Formalities
- - - (0.52) _
Interaction of
LLC with - - 0.108 -
Dominion
- __ (0.47) _
Interaction of

















Constant -0.405 -0.405 -3.071* -0.531 -0.534 -0.544
(0.42) (0.42) (0.85) (0.44) (0.36) (0.41)
Log -431.49888 -404.49136 -124.20752 -424.113 -444.61949 -
Likelihood I
Pseudo R2 0.0645 0.066 0.123 0.072 0.0361 -
Observations 754 754 754 742 754 810
PRE 2.146 -5.603 -2.228 1.486 -0.941 0
* p:5 0.05 (two-tailed)
Robust standard errors listed in parentheses
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